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NOTE 
LAJOIEu THOMPSON: DOES THE 
NINTH CIRCUIT GRANT YOUNG 
VICTIMS LESS PROTECTION 
UNDER RAPE SHIELD STATUTES? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Almost every state as well as the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence has enacted rape shield laws that limit the admission 
of evidence of an alleged victim's past sexual behavior.1 In 
general, rape shield laws deny a defendant in a sexual assault 
case the opportunity to offer extrinsic evidence of the com-" 
plainant's prior sexual conduct or reputation and the opportu-
nity to cross-examine the complainant concerning her prior 
sexual conduct or reputation.2 Rape shield statutes generally 
do not violate a defendant's constitutional right to present evi-
dence.a However, a rape shield statute may deny the defend-
ant's Due Process,4 confrontation and compulsory process 
1 See 29 AM. JUR. Evidence § 496 (2d ed. 1994). See also FEn. R. EVID. 412. 
2 See 29 AM. JUR. Evidence § 496 (2d ed. 1994). See generally United States v. 
Payne, 944 F.2d 1458, 1468 (9th Cir. 1991) (trial for child molestation, defendant not 
allowed to introduce evidence of alleged victim's prior sexual encounter with another 
person); Wood v. Alaska, 957 F.2d 1544, 1545-1546 (9th Cir. 1992) (trial for rape, 
defendant precluded from introducing evidence that alleged victim showed the 
defendant her Penthouse photographs and that she spoke about her pornographic 
acting experiences); Tague v. Richards, 3 F.3d 1133, 1137 (7th Cir. 1993) (trial for 
child molestation, the trial court precluded evidence that the alleged victim had pre-
viously been molested by her father). 
3 See 29 AM. JUR. Evidence § 496 (2d ed. 1994). The defendant's Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process rights and Sixth Amendment Confrontation and Compul-
sory Process Clause rights can be implicated by application of a rape shield statute 
that may limit or exclude evidence of the complainant's sexual history or reputation. 
See id. 
• See supra note 3 and accompanying text. The Fourteenth Amendment provides 
in pertinent part: "[nlor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property 
1 
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rights.5 In June 2000, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit addressed whether the trial court violated 
Clint LaJoie's Due Process, confrontation, and compulsory 
process rights.6 
In LaJoie v. Thompson,7 the Ninth Circuit held that the 
trial court's preclusion of evidence regarding the victim's prior 
sexual abuse by others as a sanction for LaJoie's failure to 
comply with the 15-day notice requirement in Oregon's rape 
shield law violated LaJoie's Sixth Amendment rights.8 The 
Ninth Circuit further held that the preclusion of this evidence 
regarding the prior sexual abuse of the victim warranted 
habeas relief 9 
In Part II, this Note discusses LaJoie's facts and procedu-
ral history. Part III outlines the history of the Habeas Corpus 
statutes and discusses the Oregon and Federal rape shield 
statutes, with an emphasis on how these types of statutes af-
without due process of law ... " See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
6 See 29 AM. JUR. Evidence § 496 (2d ed. 1994). See also supra note 3 and accom-
panying text. The Sixth Amendment provides in pertinent part: "In all criminal pros-
ecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him [and) to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor 
... " See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
6 See LaJoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 667 (9th Cir. 2000). The appeal from 
the United States District Court for the District of Oregon was argued and submitted 
July 13, 1999 before Circuit Judge Fletcher, Circuit Judge Ferguson and Circuit 
Judge Tashima. [d. at 663. The opinion was filed on January 31, 2000. [d. The opin-
ion was subsequently withdrawn and an amended opinion filed on June 23, 2000. [d. 
Circuit Judge Tashima authored the opinion. [d. at 665. Circuit Judge Ferguson au-
thored a dissenting opinion. See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 665. 
7 See 217 F.3d 663 (9th Cir. 2000). 
8 See id. at 673. See generally OR. REV. STAT. § 40.210(3)(a) (West 2000) (Rule 
412, Oregon's "Rape Shield" Law). Oregon's Rule 412 provides in relevant part: 
"(1) . .. reputation or opinion evidence of the past sexual behavior of an alleged 
victim of such crime is not admissible; (2) . . . evidence of a victim's past sexual be-
havior other than reputation or opinion evidence is also not admissible, unless such 
evidence other than reputation or opinion evidence: (a) is admitted in accordance 
with subsection (4) of this section; and (b) Is evidence that: (A) relates to the motive 
or bias of the alleged victim; or (B) Is necessary to rebut or explain scientific or medi-
cal evidence offered by the state; or (C) Is otherwise constitutionally required to be 
admitted." See OR. REV. STAT. § 40.210(1)-(2)(a)-(2)(b)(A)-(C). Under Rule 412, "past 
sexual behavior" generally applies to child sexual abuse. See LaJoie: 217 F.3d at 666 
(citing State v. Wright, 776 P.2d 1294, 1298 (1989)). 
9 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 673. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the exclusion of 
this relevant evidence seriously undermined LaJoie's defense. [d. 
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fect a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment confrontation 
and compulsory process and Fourteenth Amendment Due Pro-
cess rights. Part IV analyzes the Ninth Circuit's reasoning. in 
LaJoie. Part V critiques the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in light 
of the majority's determination that the probative value of the 
excluded evidence substantially outweighed its potential prej-
udicial effect. Part VI concludes that the Ninth Circuit im-
properly held that excluding the evidence created a constitu-
tional error because the prejudicial effect of the evidence 
substantially outweighed its low probative value. Accordingly, 
the Ninth Circuit improperly granted LaJoie's writ of habeas 
corpus because the trial court did not commit constitutional 
error to warrant habeas relief. 
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The state accused Clint LaJoie of sexually abusing, orally 
sodomizing, and raping his girlfriend's niece, VN, a minor 
child.10 While VN lived with her aunt and LaJoie, LaJoie al-
10 See id. at 665. "VN" is used to protect the identity of the minor victim who 
was seven and eight years old at the time of the alleged sexual assaults. See id. The 
State charged LaJoie with rape in the first degree, OR. REV. STAT. § 163.375, sodomy 
in the first degree, OR. REV. STAT. § 163.405, and sexual abuse in the first degree, 
OR. REV. STAT. § 163.427, involving a child under the age of 12 years. See State v. La-
Joie, 849 P.2d 479, 481 (1993). A person is guilty of rape in the first degree if: 
"(a) the victim is subjected to forcible compulsion by the person; (b) the victim 
is under 12 years of age; (c) the victim is under 16 years of age and is the per-
son's sibling, of the whole or half blood, the person's child or the person's 
spouse's child; or (d) the victim is incapable of consent by reason of mental de-
fect, mental incapacitation or physical helplessness." (OR. REV. STAT. § 163.375 
(West 2000)). 
A person is guilty of sodomy in the first degree if he engages in deviate sexual inter-
course with another person or causes another person to engage in deviate sexual in-
tercourse if: 
"(a) the victim is subjected to forcible compulsion by the person; (b) the victim 
is under 12 years of age; (c) the victim is under 16 years of age and is the per-
son's sibling, of the whole or half blood, the person's child or the person's 
spouse's child; or (d) the victim is incapable of consent by reason of mental de-
fect, mental incapacitation or physical helplessness." (OR. REV. STAT. § 163.405 
(West 2000». 
A person is guilty of sexual abuse in the first degree if he: 
"(a) subjects another person to sexual contact and: (A) the victim is less than 
14 years of age; (B) the victim is subjected to forcible compulsion by the actor; 
or (C) the victim is incapable of consent by reason of being mentally defective, 
3
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legedly groped, fondled, and raped VN almost every night.ll 
Undisputed evidence showed that VN suffered sexual abuse 
by four different men prior to residing with her aunt and 
LaJoie. 12 
Following several continuances at the request of the 
State, the court set LaJoie's trial for October 31, 1989.13 On 
October 24, 1989, LaJoie filed a notice of intent to offer evi-
dence under Oregon Revised Statute Section 40.210 (Rule 
412) that others sexually abused VN in the past.14 In addi-
tion, LaJoie filed a motion to compel the production of evi-
dence in the Children Service's division (hereinafter "CSD") 
case file pertaining to this abuse. 15 
The State moved to strike the evidence on the basis that 
LaJoie had failed to comply with Oregon Rule 412's 15-day 
mentally incapacitated or physically helpless; or (b) intentionally causes a per-
son under 18 years of age to touch or contact the mouth, anus or sex organs of 
an animal for the purpose of arousing or gratifying the sexual desire of a per-
son." (OR. REV. STAT. § 163.427 (West 2000». 
11 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 674. LaJoie was the boyfriend of VN's aunt. See id. 
VN's testimony showed that LaJoie came to VN almost every night, shook her awake, 
took off her underwear, and groped, fondled, and raped her while her aunt slept. [d. 
According to VN, LaJoie threatened to whip her with his leather belt if she told any-
one. [d. 
12 See id. at 665. The uncontested evidence in the Children Service's Division 
(hereinafter, "CSD"), case file showed that VN had been sexually abused by four 
other men and raped by one other man in unrelated incidents. See LaJoie, 217 F.3d 
at 665. The specific incidents of abuse contained in the CSD case file were: (1) 
Michael Patterson had raped VN's brother and that he may have assaulted VN when 
she was two years old; (2) a boyfriend of VN's mother, Mike Forrest, may have sexu-
ally assaulted VN; (3) VN's great-uncle Daniel Leuck had admitted to fondling her 
rectal and vaginal areas on several occasions; (4) Brian Dayton, a teenager, had pul-
led down her pants on one occasion; and (5) Russell Watkins, another of her mother's 
boyfriends, had been convicted of raping and sexually abusing VN. [d. at 666. The 
CSD is now called the State Commission on Children and Families. See OR. REV. 
STAT. § 417.705 (West 2000). Oregon created the State Commission on Children and 
Families to promote the wellness of children and families at the state level. See OR. 
REV. STAT. § 417.735 (West 2000). The State Commission on Children and Families 
(formerly the CSD) evaluates reports of child neglect and abuse. See Bryan J. Orrio, 
Comment, Ending the Domestic Violence Cycle Through Victim Education in Oregon's 
Restraining Order Process, 33 WILLAME'ITE L. REV. 971, 990 (1997). 
13 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 665. The trial did not start as scheduled on October 
31, 1989, but was continued until November 3, 1989. [d. at 672 n.12. 
14 See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
15 See supra note 12 and accompanying text; infra note 16 and accompanying 
text. 
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notice requirement.16 The trial court conducted an in camera17 
review of the CSD file pursuant to Rule 412(4)(b) and con-
cluded that the file did contain evidence potentially admissi~ 
ble under Rule 412(2)(b)(A) and (2)(b)(B).18 Nevertheless, the 
court granted the State's motion to exclude the evidence be-
cause LaJoie failed to meet the fifteen-day notice requirement 
under Rule 412(4)(a).19 
16 See OR. REv. STAT. § 40.210(4)(a) (West 2000) (Rule 412(4)(a», which provides 
that: "If the person accused of committing rape, sodomy or sexual abuse or attempted 
rape, sodomy or sexual abuse intends to offer evidence under subsection (2) or (3) of 
this section, the accused shall make a written motion to offer the evidence not later 
than 15 days before the date on which the trial in which the evidence is to be offered 
is scheduled to begin, except that the court may allow the motion to be made at a 
later date, including during trial, if the court determines either that the evidence is 
newly discovered and could not have been obtained earlier through the exercise of 
due diligence or that the issue to which the evidence relates has newly arisen in the 
case." See id. See also LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 666 n.3. 
17 See OR. REv. STAT. § 40.210(4)(b) (West 2000) (Rule 412(4)(b». Section 40.210 
provides in pertinent part that: "If the court determines that the offer of proof con-
tains evidence described in subsection (2) or (3) of this section, the court shall order a 
hearing in camera to determine if the evidence is admissible." [d. At the hearing the 
parties may call witnesses, including the alleged victim, and offer relevant evidence. 
[d. "In camera" means out of the presence of the public and the jury. See OR. REv. 
STAT. § 40.210(5)(b) (Rule 412(5)(b». An in camera hearing serves two purposes: (1) it 
gives the defendant the opportunity to demonstrate to the court why certain evidence 
is admissible and ought to be presented to the jury; and (2) at the same time it pro-
tects the privacy of the victim in those instances where the court finds that evidence 
is inadmissible. See State v. LaJoie, 312 Or. 286, 397-398 (1991). 
18 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 666. The trial court concluded that the CSD file con-
tained evidence ·potentially admissible under Rule 412(2)(b)(B) because it was rele-
vant to rebut or explain medical evidence offered by the State. [d. The State offered 
evidence that VN had scarring on her hymen consistent with penetration and repeti-
tive sexual abuse. [d. at 666-667. The evidence in the CSD file that Russell Watkins, 
one of VN's mother's boyfriends, had been convicted of raping VN was relevant to re-
but or ~xplain the State's evidence of VN's injuries. [d. at 666. The court also found 
that one piece of evidence from the CSD file was relevant to show the motive or the 
bias of the alleged victim, VN, because it tended to show that VN's allegations were 
false and were invited by CSD caseworkers, and thus was potentially admissible 
under Rule 412(2)(b)(A). [d. 
19 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 666. The specific evidence which LaJoie intended to of-
fer was that: (1) Michael Patterson had raped VN's brother and that he may have as-
saulted VN when she was two years old; (2) a boyfriend of VN's mother, Mike For-
rest, may have sexually assaulted VN; (3) VN's great-uncle Daniel Leuck had 
admitted to fondling her rectal and vaginal areas on several occasions; (4) Brian Day-
ton, a teenager, had pulled down her pants on one occasion; and (5) Russell Watkins, 
another of her mother's boyfriends, had been convicted of raping and sexually abus-
5
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At trial, the jury convicted LaJoie of first-degree rape, 
sodomy, and sexual abuse of VN and sentenced him to consec-
utive terms totaling 45 years with a mandatory minimum 
sentence of 10 years.20 LaJoie appealed his conviction to the 
Oregon Court of Appeals claiming that the trial court's ruling 
to exclude certain evidence under the notice provision of Ore-
gon's Rule 412 denied him his Sixth Amendment Confronta-
tion21 and Compulsory Process22 rights as well as his Four-
teenth Amendment Due Process rights.23 The Oregon Court of 
Appeals summarily affirmed the trial court's ruling.24 
LaJoie petitioned for review by the Oregon Supreme 
Court.25 The Oregon Supreme Court granted discretionary re-
view and affirmed the Oregon Court of Appeals.26 On Decem-
ing VN. [d. LaJoie did not meet the exceptions under Rule 412's notice requirement 
for newly discovered evidence or evidence relating to a new issue because the court 
determined that LaJoie's attorney learned of the evidence well before the deadline 
and LaJoie admitted that the evidence was known to defense counsel well in advance 
of the notice deadline. [d. at 675. See also supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
20 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 667. First-degree rape and sodomy are Class A felonies 
and first-degree sexual abuse is a Class B felony. See OR. REV. STAT. §§ 163.375, 
163.405, and 163.427 (West 2000). The maximum term of an indeterminate sentence 
of imprisonment for a Class A felony is 20 years and for a Class B felony, 10 years. 
See OR. REV. STAT. §§ 161.605(1).(2) (West 2000). 
21 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 667. See also supra note 5 and accompanying text. The 
main purpose of the Confrontation Clause is to ensure a criminal defendant the op-
portunity to cross-examine witnesses testifying against him. See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 
668 (citing Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678-679 (1986)). 
22 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 667. See also supra note 5 and accompanying text. The 
United States Supreme Court has held that the Compulsory Process Clause guaran-
tees at a minimum that criminal defendant have the right to the government's assis-
tance in compelling the attendance of favorable witnesses at trial and the right to 
put before a jury evidence that might influence the determination of guilt. See La-
Joie, 217 F.3d at 668 (citing Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 56 (1987)). 
23 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 667. See also supra note 4 and accompanying text. The 
Ninth Circuit in LaJoie v. Thompson articulated that whether directly rooted in the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, or in the Compulsory Process or 
Confrontation clauses of the Sixth Amendment, the Constitution guarantees criminal 
defendants a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense. See LaJoie, 217 
F.3d at 668 (citing Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986». 
24 See State v. LaJoie, 804 P.2d 1230 (1991) (affirmed LaJoie's conviction without 
published opinion). 
26 See LaJoie, 849 P.2d at 480. 
26 See id. at 490. The Oregon Supreme Court, in a divided 4-3 decision, held that 
an defendant's failure to give statutorily mandated notice under Rule 412 requires a 
trial court to refuse to allow the accused to present such evidence at trial and this re-
6
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ber 31, 1996, LaJoie filed a petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus alleging that the trial court's ruling to exclude evi-
dence offered under Rule 412 violated his Sixth Amendment 
rights of confrontation and compulsory process and his Four-
teenth Amendment right to due process.27 The United States 
District Court for the District of Oregon denied LaJoie's peti-
tion.2s LaJoie appealed the district court's denial of his peti-
tion for a writ of habeas corpus to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.29 The Ninth Circuit granted re-
quirement is constitutional. [d. The Oregon Supreme Court found that the process re-
quired by Rule 412 for the admission of evidence of past sexual behavior of an al-
leged victim of a sexual crime is neither arbitrary nor disproportionate to the 
purposes that it is intended to serve. [d. The Oregon Supreme Court further found 
that the process established by Rule 412 is a reasonable condition on the defendant's 
right to present evidence and is justified by legitimate state interests in avoiding un-
due trial delay and in protecting the alleged victims of sexual crimes from harass-
ment. [d. Moreover, the Court found that Rule 412 contains adequate mechanisms 
for excusing noncompliance in those situations in which the noncompliance occurs for 
reasons beyond the defendant's control. See LaJoie, 849 P.2d at 490. The dissent ar-
gued that the case should be remanded for the trial court to make the necessary judi-
cial inquiry and pertinent findings within the special procedural framework; as set 
forth in Rule 412(3), within which the admissibility of the alleged victim's prior sex-
ual conduct must be determined. [d. at 499. The dissent found that strict application 
of the statutory rule, as required by the majority, violates the federal constitution. [d. 
27 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 667. LaJoie filed his petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus pursuant to 28 US.C. §§ 2241 and 2254. [d. A person may file a petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus on the grounds that he or she is in custody in violation of the 
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States once he or she has exhausted 
the remedies available in the courts of the State or there is an absence of available 
State corrective process; or circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to 
protect the rights of the applicant. See 28 US.C. § 2254(a) and (b) (West 2000). The 
United States Supreme Court, any justice thereof, may consider writs of habeas 
corpus the district courts and any circuit judge within their respective jurisdictions. 
See 28 US.C. § 2254(a). LaJoie properly petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus to the 
United States District Court for the District of Oregon as he alleged that he is in cus-
tody in violation of the Constitution of the United States. See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 667. 
28 US.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2) provides that "an application for a writ of habeas corpus on 
behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be 
granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court 
proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim: (1) resulted in a decision that was 
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal 
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a 
decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 
evidence presented in a State court proceeding." 28 US.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2). 
28 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 667 (petition denied without published opinion). 
29 See id. 
7
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view of the district court's decision to deny LaJoie's petition 
for writ of habeas corpus, challenging his conviction for rape, 
sodomy, and sexual abuse of a minor child.30 
III. BACKGROUND 
A. HABEAS CORPUS 
Historically, common law courts used the writ of habeas 
corpus to protect and extend their own jurisdiction.31 Pres-
ently, state prisoners seek habeas corpus relief attacking the 
validity of fact or the length of his or her confinement after 
the prisoner has exhausted all available state court remedies 
or the prisoner shows circumstances that render available 
State processes ineffective to protect his or her rights.32 The 
30 See id. The United States District Court for the District of Oregon issued a 
certificate of appealability. See id. The certificate of appealability certifies the issues 
to be considered by the Ninth Circuit on appeal. See FED. R. APP. P. 22(b)(1); 9th Cir. 
R. 22-1(a)-(d). The district court issues the certificate of appealability when peti-
tioner's claims have been adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings, which' 
is a necessary prerequisite to obtain relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(l). See Canales 
v. Roe, 151 F.3d 1226, 1227-1228 (9th Cir. 1998); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The Ninth 
Circuit has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253. See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 
667. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 the courts of appeals have jurisdiction of appeals from 
all final decisions of the district courts of the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
The final order in a habeas corpus proceeding is subject to review by the court of ap-
peals for the circuit in which the proceeding is held. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253. The circuit 
court reviews de novo a district court's decision to grant or deny a § 2254 habeas pe-
tition. See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 667. 
31 See Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 58-59 (1967). Habeas corpus was a common-
law writ prior to its statutory establishment by the Habeas Corpus Act of May 27, 
1679, and was recognized in the federal Constitution and regulated by former §§ 451 
to 456 (now § 2241 et seq.) of Title 28. 
32 See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 477 (1973). Federal habeas relief is de-
pendent upon an unconstitutional state court adjudication because a state prisoner's 
right to federal habeas relief is created by the entry of an unconstitutional state 
court judgment subjecting the prisoner to incarceration or death. See Jeffries v. Wood, 
114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997). See also 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 and 2254. Section 
2241 defines what persons are eligible for habeas corpus relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 
It provides in pertinent part: 
"(a) writs of habeas corpus may be granted by the United States Supreme 
Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit judge within their 
respective jurisdictions; (b) the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, and any 
circuit judge may decline to entertain an application for a writ of habeas 
corpus and may transfer the application for hearing and determination to the 
8
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habeas corpus statute authorizes a federal court to issue a 
writ of habeas corpus to require the agency holding the appli-
cant in custody to produce witnesses to testify at a hearing.33 
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
district court having jurisdiction to entertain it; (c) the writ of habeas corpus 
shall not extend to a prisoner unless: (1) he is in custody under or by color of 
the authority of the United States or is committed for trial before some court 
thereof; or (2) he is in custody for an act done or omitted in pursuance of an 
Act of Congress, or an order, process, judgment or decree of a court or judge of 
the United States; or (3) he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or 
laws or treaties of the United States." [d. 
Section 2254 defines the applicability of habeas corpus. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254. It pro-
vides in pertinent part: 
"(a) the United States Supreme Court, a justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a 
district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in be-
half of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on 
the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or 
treaties of the United States; (b)(1) an application for a writ of habeas corpus 
on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court 
shall not be granted unless it appears that-(A) the applicant has exhausted 
the remedies available in the courts of the State; or (B)(i) there is an absence 
of available State corrective process; or (ii) circumstances exist that render 
such process ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant; (d) an application 
for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the 
judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that 
was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudica-
tion of the claim---(l) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved 
an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined 
by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that 
was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evi-
dence presented in the State court proceeding; and (e)(1) in a proceeding insti-
tuted by an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pur-
suant to the judgment of a State court, a determination of a factual issue made 
by a State court shall be presumed to be correct. The application shall have 
the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing 
evidence." [d. 
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 which applies to 
LaJoie's petition, a federal court may grant a writ of habeas corpus if the relevant 
state-court decision was either (1) contrary to ... clearly established Federal law, as 
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States, or (2) involved an unreasona-
ble application of. . . clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme 
Court of the United States. See id.; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). In a federal habeas pro-
ceeding the standard for determining whether habeas relief must be granted is 
whether . . . the error had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determin-
ing the jury's verdict. See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 673 (citing Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 
U.S. 619, 623 (1993)). 
33 See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
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(hereinafter, "AEDPA"), became law on April 26, 1996 and ap-
plies to petitions for a writ of habeas corpus filed after that 
date.34 A federal court may grant a writ of habeas corpus only 
if the State court's decision was either contrary to, or involved 
an unreasonable application of Federal law as established by 
the Supreme Court of the United States.35 
1. Contrary to Clearly Established Federal Law 
In Williams v. Taylor,36 the United States Supreme Court 
spelled out the meaning of the "contrary to" clearly estab-
lished federal law clause.37 The Court first cited the dictionary 
definition of the word "contrary" to mean diametrically differ-
ent from, mutually opposed to, or opposite in character or na-
ture,38 The Court next examined the text of § 2254(d)(1) which 
requires that the state court's decision must be substantially 
different from the relevant precedent of the United States Su-
preme Court.39 Accordingly, a state court's decision will be 
34 See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, PUB.L. NO. 104-
132, 110 Stat. 1214. See also Wood, 114 F.3d at 1493-1494 (9th Cir. 1997). In Wood, 
the Ninth Circuit held, in line with the Second, Third and Tenth Circuits, that the 
AEDPA cannot be applied retroactively to actions filed prior to the enactment date. 
See Wood, 114 F.3d at 1493-1494. See generally Boria v. Keane, 90 F.3d 36, 38 (2d Cir. 
1996); Burkett v. Love, 89 F.3d 135, 138 n.2 (3d Cir. 1996); Edens v. Hannigan, 87 
F.3d 1109, 1112 n.1 (10th Cir. 1996). Accordingly, the AEDPA applies to LaJoie's peti-
tion for a writ of habeas corpus because he filed it after the AEDPA's effective date of 
April 24, 1996. See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 667. In the AEDPA, Congress placed a restric-
tion on the federal courts' power to grant writs of habeas corpus to state prisoners. 
See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 427-428 (2000). 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), prohibits 
a federal court from granting an application for a writ of habeas corpus with respect 
to a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless that adjudication "resulted 
in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 
35 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). See also supra note 28 and accompanying text. The 
Court has determined that the "contrary to" and "unreasonable application" clauses 
are accorded independent meaning. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 425. 
36 529 U.S. 362 (2000). 
37 See id. 
38 See id. (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 495 (1976)). 
39 See Williams, 529 U.S. at 424. The Williams Court found Williams' constitu-
tionally guaranteed right to effective assistance of counsel was established at the 
time his state court conviction became final. See id. Therefore, if his trial lawyer's 
failure to investigate and to present substantial mitigating evidence to the sentencing 
jury was either contrary to or an unreasonable application of established law, Wil-
10
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contrary to clearly established United States Supreme Court 
precedent if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the 
governing law set forth in United States Supreme Court 
cases.40 In addition, a state court's decision is contrary to 
clearly established United States Supreme Court precedent if 
that court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistin-
guishable from a decision of the United States Supreme 
Court, but nevertheless arrives at a different result from that 
of established United States Supreme Court precedent.41 In 
Van Tran v. Lindsey,42 the Ninth Circuit noted Justice 
O'Connor's opinion in Williams that articulated the distinct 
meanings of the "contrary to" and "unreasonable application 
of" clauses in § 2254(d)(1).43 The Ninth Circuit reiterated the 
rule articulated by the Court in Williams: a state court's deci-
sion is "contrary to" federal law if it either 1) fails to apply 
the correct controlling authority, or 2) applies the controlling 
authority to a case involving facts materially indistinguish-
able from those in a controlling case, but nonetheless reaches 
a different result.44 
liams was entitled to habeas relief. See id. at 415-416. The Court found that Williams 
was entitled to relief because his counsel's failure to present mitigating evidence de-
prived him of his constitutionally protected right to provide mitigating evidence to 
the sentencing jury in his murder trial. [d. at 420-42l. 
40 See id. at 425-426. In Williams, Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the 
Court as to part II. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 424. Her opinion, which was cited by 
the Ninth Circuit in LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 667-668, used the Court's decision in Strick-
land v. Washington to illustrate when a state court's decision will be contrary to 
clearly established United States Supreme Court precedent. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 
425-426; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). Her opinion in Williams 
stated that if a State court rejected a prisoner's claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel on the grounds that the prisoner had not established by a preponderance of 
the evidence that the result of his criminal trial would have been different, that 
State court decision would be "contrary to" clearly established United States Supreme 
Court precedent because the Court held in Strickland that a prisoner only must 
demonstrate a "reasonable probability that . . . the result would have been differ-
ent." See Williams, 529 U.S. at 425-426; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 
4' See Williams, 529 U.S. at 426. 
42 212 F.3d 1143, 1150 (9th Cir. 2000). 
43 See id. at 1150 . 
.. See id. See also Williams, 529 U.S. at 425-426; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 
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2. Unreasonable Application 
In Williams v. Taylor,45 Justice O'Connor defined the 
meaning of the "unreasonable application of" clause of § 
2254(d)(1).46 She stated that when a state court decision un-
reasonably applies the law of the United States Supreme 
Court to the facts of the applicant's case, the reviewing fed-
eral court may conclude that the state court decision falls 
within § 2254(d)(1)'s "unreasonable application" clause.47 The 
Williams court held that the reviewing federal court must in-
quire whether the state court's application of clearly estab-
lished federal law was objectively unreasonable.48 Justice 
O'Connor emphasized that an unreasonable application of fed-
eral law differs from an incorrect application of federal law.49 
Accordingly, under the "unreasonable application" clause of § 
2254(d)(1), the State court's application of clearly established 
federal law must be erroneous or incorrect as well as objec-
tively unreasonable. 50 
The Ninth Circuit in Van Tran v. Lindsey5l applied Jus-
tice O'Connor's definition of "unreasonable application" in Wil-
liams. 52 However, the Ninth Circuit recognized, as did the 
46 529 u.s. 362 (2000). 
46 See id. at 427-429. 
47 See id. at 427. 
48 See id. at 428. The Court rejected the Fourth Circuit's subjective "reasonable 
jurists" test in Green v. French, 143 F.3d 865, 870 (4th Cir. 1998) that a State court 
decision involves an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law only 
if the State court applied the Federal law in a manner that reasonable jurists would 
all agree is unreasonable. [d. at 427-428. The Court found that this "all reasonable 
jurists" standard would mislead federal habeas courts by focusing their attention on 
a subjective rather than on an objective one. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 428. 
49 See id. Justice O'Connor explained that a "state court's incorrect legal determi-
nation has [never] been allowed to stand because it was reasonable." [d. at 429. She 
emphasized that "Congress specifically used the word 'unreasonable,' and not a term 
like 'erroneous' or 'incorrect.' " [d. Justice O'Connor further stated that under the 
"unreasonable application" clause, a federal habeas court may not issue a writ of 
habeas corpus simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that 
the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously 
or incorrectly, rather, the application must also be unreasonable. [d. 
50 See Williams, 529 U.S. at 429. 
61 212 F.3d 1143, 1150 (9th Cir. 2000). 
62 See id. at 1150. See also LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 667-68; Williams, 529 U.S. at 427. 
A state court's decision can involve an "unreasonable application" of federal law if it 
either 1) correctly identifies the governing rule but then applies it to a new set of 
12
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Court in Williams, that these two categories could overlap 
making it difficult to determine whether a State court's deci-
sion unreasonably extended a rule to a new context or simply 
contradicted controlling authority. 53 
3. Error Must Have Substantial and Injurious Effect or 
Influence 
Once error has been found, the reviewing federal court 
must find that the error had a substantial and injurious effect 
or influence on the jury's verdict.54 In Kotteakos v. United 
States,55 the Court considered whether the petitioners suffered 
substantial prejudice from being convicted of a single general 
conspiracy when the evidence, as conceded by the Govern-
ment, proved not one, but eight or more different conspiracies 
of the same sort executed through a common key figure. 56 The 
Court held that the error's effect must be weighed against the 
entire setting of the record in relation to the judgment. 57 The 
inquiry must be whether the particular error had substantial 
influence on the jury.58 The Court concluded that the error 
permeated the entire trial and those petitioners' rights not to 
be tried collectively for the group of distinct and separate of-
fenses was substantially affected.59 Therefore, the Court found 
it highly probable that the error had a substantial and injuri-
facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable, or 2) extends or fails to extend a 
clearly established legal principle to a new context in a way that is objectively unrea-
sonable. See Van Tran, 212 F.3d at 1150. 
63 See Van Tran, 212 F.3d at 1150. See also Williams, 529 U.S. at 427. The Ninth 
Circuit further noted that in some cases the reviewing federal court may have diffi-
culty distinguishing between a State court decision that is contrary to clearly estab-
lished Federal law or that constitutes an unreasonable application of clearly estab-
lished Federal law. See VanTran, 212 F.3d at 1150. In those cases it will be necessary 
for the reviewing federal court to test the petitioner's allegations against both stan-
dards. [d. at 1150. 
64 See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993). 
66 328 U.S. 750 (1946). 
66 See id. at 752. 
67 See id. at 764. The Court articulated that the reviewing court must take into 
account what the error meant to the jury, not singled out and standing alone. [d. 
58 See id. The Court emphasized that if "one cannot say, with fair assurance, af-
ter pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous action from the 
whole, that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error, it is impossible 
to conclude that substantial rights were not affected." Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 765. 
69 See id. at 769, 775. 
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ous effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict and 
granted habeas relief.60 
In Brecht v. Abrahamson,61 the Court addressed whether 
the State's erroneous references to the defendant's post-
Miranda silence during the trial for impeachment purposes 
substantially influenced the jury's verdict.62 The Court applied 
the "substantial and injurious effect or influence" standard 
and concluded that the error committed at Brecht's trial did 
not substantially influence the jury's verdict because, when 
considering the record as a whole, the State's references to 
Brecht's post-Miranda silence were infrequent and were, in ef-
fect, merely cumulative of the extensive and permissible refer-
ences to his pre-Miranda silence.63 Accordingly, the Court did 
not grant habeas relief. 64 
B. CLEARLY ESTABLISHED FEDERAL LAW 
The Court has traditionally been reluctant to impose con-
stitutional restraints on ordinary evidentiary rulings by state 
trial courtS.65 The Court has consistently held that the Consti-
tution reserves wide latitude to trial judges in criminal trials 
to exclude evidence that' is repetitive, poses an undue risk of 
harassment, prejudice or confusion of the issues, or is only 
60 See id. at 776. 
6l 507 U.S. 619 (1993). 
62 See id. at 622-23. At Brecht's trial for first-degree murder he testified that he 
shot the victim, but claimed that it was an accident. [d. at 624. During cross-
examination the state made references to Brecht's pre-Miranda silence because he 
failed to mention to anyone that the shooting had been an accident. [d. at 625. The 
state's closing argument made references to both Brecht's pre-Miranda and post-Mi-
randa silence. See id. The Court held that the state's error did not warrant habeas 
relief because the improper references to Brecht's post-Miranda silence were infre-
quent when considered in the context of all the evidence, and therefore, did not sub-
stantially influence the jury's verdict. See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 639. 
63 See id. The Court also found that the evidence of Brecht's guilt was certainly 
weighty, if not overwhelming, and that circumstantial evidence also pointed to his 
guilt. [d. 
64 See id. 
65 See Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 689 (1986). The Court reasoned that in 
any given criminal case a trial judge must make dozens, and sometimes hundreds, of 
decisions regarding the admissibility of evidence. [d. at 689. Therefore, the Court is 
reluctant to impose constitutional restraints on ordinary evidentiary rulings by state 
trial court. [d. 
14
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marginally relevant.66 Furthermore, the Court has never ques-
tioned the State's power to exclude evidence through eviden-
tiary rules that serve the interests of fairness and reliability.67 
1. Rape Shield Statutes 
a. General Character Evidence Rules 
Generally, evidence of the character or reputation of a 
party has long been held to be legally irrelevant in determin-
ing a controversy, and therefore, inadmissible.68 Historically, 
as an exception to this rule, evidence of the victim's general 
reputation for chastity could be admitted in a prosecution for 
rape.69 Today, rape shield statutes have been enacted by the 
Federal Rules of Evidence and by most states which bar or 
limit the admissibility of evidence of the victim's past sexual 
history or reputation.70 Rape shield statutes reflect the judg-
ment that most evidence about chastity has far too little pro-
bative value on the issue of consent to justify extensive and 
66 See generally Crane, 476 U.S. at 689-690; Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679. Federal 
. Rule of Evidence 403 provides that relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger or unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence. FED. R. EVID. 403. 
67 See Crane, 476 U.S. at 690; Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973). 
68 See 29 AM. JUR. Evidence § 363 (2d 1994). Federal Rule of Evidence 404 pro-
vides in relevant part that "evidence of a person's character or a trait of character is 
not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particu-
lar occasion . . . except evidence of a particular character trait of the victim of the 
crime offered by the accused . . . " FED. R. EVID. 404. Oregon Revised Statute § 
40.170 (also known as Oregon Evidence Code Rule 404) provides in relevant part 
that: "(1) evidence of a person's character or trait of character is admissible when it 
is an essential element of a charge, claim or defense; (2) evidence of a person's char-
acter is not admissible for the purpose of proving that the person acted in conformity 
therewith on a particular occasion, except: (b) evidence of a pertinent trait of charac-
ter of the victim of the crime offered by an accused." OR. REV. STAT. § 40.170. 
69 See 29 AM. JUR. Evidence § 373 (2d 1994). This evidence was admissible to 
show consent. See id. See also FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2) and OR. REV. STAT. § 
40.170(2)(b) (Rule 404). Both Federal Rule of Evidence 404 and Oregon Evidence 
Code 404 provide that a defendant may offer evidence of a pertinent character trait 
of the victim of the crime that allows a defendant to introduce evidence of the vic-
tim's general reputation for chastity to prove consent. See id. See also supra note 68 
and accompanying text. 
70 See 1 JOHN W. STRONG, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 193, at 822 (4th ed. 1992). 
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intrusive inquiry into a victim's sexual history. 71 
h. Rape Shield Statutes 
Oregon has enacted an exclusionary rape shield statute.72 
Oregon's Rule 412 primarily seeks to protect victims of sexual 
crimes from degrading and embarrassing disclosure of inti-
mate details about their private lives.73 However, certain ex-
ceptions enumerated in Oregon's Rule 412 allow for the ad-
missibility of specific types of evidence of the sexual history 
and sexual predisposition of the victim for limited purposes.74 
71 See generally United States v. Driver, 581 F.2d 80, 81 (4th Cir. 1978); United 
States v. Kasto, 584 F.2d 268, 271-272 (8th Cir. 1978); State ex reI. Pope v. Superior 
Court, 545 P.2d 946, 950-951 (Ariz. 1976). 
72 See OR. REv. STAT. § 40.210 (OR. EVID. CODE Rule 412). See text accompanying 
note 8. Federal Rule of Evidence 412 is similar. See FED. R. EVID. 412. It provides in 
relevant part: "(a)(1) Evidence offered to prove that any alleged victim engaged in 
other sexual behavior; or (a)(2) Evidence offered to prove any alleged victim's sexual 
predisposition, is not admissible in any civil or criminal proceeding involving alleged 
sexual misconduct except as provided in subdivisions (b) and (c)." [d. 
73 See LaJoie, 849 P.2d at 489. Oregon's Rule 412 is also intended to encourage 
victims of sexual misconduct to report and assist in the prosecution of the crime ,by 
preventing highly prejudicial evidence from reaching the jury and thus helping to 
protect jury impartiality. [d. The statute serves legitimate state interests in protect-
ing the victim because the prospect of having past sexual conduct divulged affects not 
only the victim's decision to report the sex crime but also the victim's willingness to 
see the process through. [d. at 483-484. The purposes of Federal Rule of Evidence 
412 are similar. See FED. R. EVID. 412, Advisory Committee Notes. Federal Rule of 
Evidence 412 aims to safeguard the alleged victim against the invasion of privacy, 
potential embarrassment and sexual stereotyping that is associated with public dis-
closure of intimate sexual details and the infusion of sexual innuendo into the fact-
finding process. [d. Federal Rule of Evidence 412 is constructed to achieve the objec-
tives of carefully balancing the victim's interests in retaining some privacy and dig-
nity with the defendant's constitutional rights under the Fourteenth and Sixth 
Amendments to present a complete defense and of encouraging victims of sexual mis-
conduct to institute and to participate in legal proceedings against alleged offenders. 
See FED. R. EVID. 412, Congressional Discussion. 
74 See OR. REV. STAT. § 40.210 (Rule 412(b» which provides that evidence of a 
victim's past sexual conduct is admissible if it: (A) relates to the motive or bias of the 
alleged victim; or (B) Is necessary to rebut or explain scientific or medical evidence 
offered by the state; or (C) Is otherwise constitutionally required to be admitted. [d. 
Similarly, Federal Rule of Evidence 412 allows some evidence of the sexual history of 
the victim to be admitted for limited purposes. See FED. R. EVID. 412. Federal Rule of 
Evidence 412 provides: "under 412(b)(1)(A), evidence of specific instances of sexual 
behavior by the alleged victim offered to prove that a person other the accused was 
the source of semen, injury or other physical evidence is admissible in a criminal 
16
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The exceptions to Oregon's Rule 412 demonstrate the balance 
that the statute strikes between protecting the victim's inter-
ests and the defendant's constitutional rights to a meaningful 
opportunity to present a complete defense.75 
The fifteen day notice requirement in Oregon Rule 412 
was also designed to serve the state's legitimate interests, in-
cluding protecting alleged victims of sex based crimes from 
surprise.76 In addition, the procedure is justified by legitimate 
state interests, including the interests in avoiding undue trial 
delay and in protecting the alleged victims of sexual crimes 
from harassment.77 Moreover, the exceptions built into the 
procedural framework of the fifteen-day notice requirement 
serve to protect the constitutional interests of the defendant 
case; likewise, under 412(b)(1)(B) evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by 
the alleged victim with respect to the person of the accused of the sexual misconduct 
offered by the accused to prove consent or by the prosecution is admissible; and 
under 412(b)(1)(C), evidence the exclusion of which would violate the constitutional 
rights of the defendant is admissible." Id. 
75 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 670-671. The defendant's Sixth Amendment right to 
present relevant testimony may, in appropriate circumstances, bo~ to accommodate 
other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process. Id. at 668. Restrictions on a 
criminal defendant's right to confront witnesses and to present relevant evidence are 
constitutional so long as they are not arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes 
they are designed to serve. Id. Before enacting Federal Rule of Evidence 412, Con-
gress made specific findings regarding the constitutional issues surrounding the fed-
eral rape shield law. See FED. R. EVID. 412, Congressional Discussion. Congress found 
in relevant part: The principal purpose of this legislation is to protect rape victims 
from the degrading and embarrassing disclosure of intimate details about their pri-
vate lives and it does so by narrowly circumscribing when such evidence may be ad-
mitted. Id. Rule 412 does not sacrifice any constitutional right possessed by the 
defendant because it fairly balances the interests involved - the rape victim's interest 
in protecting her private life from unwarranted public exposure; the defendant's in-
terest in being able adequately to present a defense by offering relevant and proba-
tive evidence; and society's interest in a fair trial, one where unduly prejudicial evi-
dence is not permitted to becloud the issues before the jury." Id. 
76 See LaJoie, 849 P.2d at 483-484. The notice requirement in Oregon's Rule 412 
serves a number of functions including: requiring the defendant to tell the prosecutor 
and the court in advance of trial of his intention to use certain evidence and to ask 
that it be admitted at trial; providing all of the parties with notice of what the 
defendant intends to prove at trial so that all parties will know what is at issue; 
preventing surprise to the prosecutor, the victim and the court; allowing the prosecu-
tor to weigh the evidence and to prepare arguments against its admission; and most 
importantly to protect against surprise, harassment and undue delay. Id. 
77 See id. 
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in preventing a full and complete defense. 78 
Michigan u. Lucas,79 demonstrated the role these legiti-
mate state interests play in a sexual assault case.80 In Lucas, 
the Court balanced the competing interests of the alleged vic-
tim and the defendant under Michigan's rape shield statute.81 
The defendant, Lucas, was convicted of criminal sexual con-
duct.82 At Lucas' trial, the court prohibited Lucas from intro-
ducing evidence of a prior sexual relationship between himself 
and the victim because Lucas failed to comply with the rape 
shield statute's 10-day notice and hearing requirements.83 The 
Court held that restrictions on a criminal defendant's Sixth 
Amendment rights may not be arbitrary or disproportionate 
to the purposes they were designed to serve.84 The Court con-
78 See id. at 489. The legislature created two exceptions to the requirement of 15 
days' notice - the evidence is newly discovered or the issue is newly arisen - which 
apply when the defendant cannot comply for reasons beyond the defendant's control 
thus protecting the defendant's constitutional right to present a full defense to the 
jury.ld. 
79 500 US. 145 (1991). 
80 See id. at 147. 
81 See id. at 146. The Lucas Court analyzed Michigan's rape shield statute that 
prohibited a criminal defendant from introducing at trial evidence of an alleged rape 
victim's past sexual conduct subject to two exceptions. Id. See also MICH. COMPo LAws 
§ 750.520j (1979). Those two exceptions are: "(1) evidence of the victim's past sexual 
conduct with the actor; and (2) evidence of specific instances of sexual activity show-
ing the source or origin of semen, pregnancy, or disease." Id. If the defendant pro-
poses to offer evidence under one of these two exceptions, the defendant must file a 
written motion and an offer or proof within 10 days after he is arraigned. Id. The 
trial court may order an in camera hearing to determine whether the proposed evi-
dence is material and not more prejudicial than probative. Id. 
82 See Lucas, 500 US. at 146. 
83 See id. 
84 See id. at 151. The Lucas Court articulated what is known as the "Lucas test," 
that restrictions on a criminal defendant's right to confront witnesses and to present 
relevant evidence may not be "arbitrary or disproportionate" to the purposes they 
were designed to serve. Id. at 151. Several United States Supreme Court cases 
demonstrate restrictions on criminal defendants' rights that are not arbitrary or dis-
proportionate to the purposes the restrictions were designed to serve: in Taylor v. Illi· 
nois, the Court held that preclusion of a defense witness' testimony as a sanction for 
defense counsel's failure to disclose the witness to the prosecution in pretrial discov-
ery was not arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes that the discovery rules 
were designed to serve. See 484 US. 400, 408-412 (1998). The Court stated that the 
rules providing for pretrial discovery serve the same purpose as the defendant's right 
to compulsory process, to ensure that the ends of justice are met by a full and fair 
presentation of the facts. Id. at 411. Notably, the Court emphasized that "the Sixth 
18
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cluded that Michigan's rape shield statute does not per se vio-
late the Sixth Amendment.8s Importantly, the Court noted 
that Michigan's rape shield statute represents a valid legisla-
tive determination that rape victims deserve heightened pro-
tection against harassment, surprise, and unnecessary inva-
sions of privacy.86 Therefore, in a sexual assault case when 
the prosecutor seeks to exclude evidence under a rape shield 
statute, the victim's as well as the state's interests must be 
balanced with the defendant's constitutional rights and 
interests.87 
2. Sixth Amendment Compulsory Process Clause 
The Court has established that under the Compulsory 
Process Clause, criminal defendants have the right to the gov-
ernment's assistance in compelling the attendance of 
favorable witnesses at trial and the right to put before the 
jury evidence that might influence the determination of 
Amendment does not confer the right to present testimony free from the legitimate 
demands of the adversarial system." Id. at 412-413 (citing United States v. Nobles, 
422 US. 225, 241 (1975)). See also Ritchie, 480 US. at 54 (1987) (restriction on crimi-
nal defendant's right to examine the victim's Children's and Youth Services file was 
not arbitrary or disproportionate where defense counsel was able to cross-examine all 
the trial witnesses fully); United States v. Scheffer, 523 US. 303, 305-309 (1998) 
(trial court's exclusion of defendant's polygraph examination results did not violate 
Sixth Amendment rights because Federal Rule of Evidence 707 which excludes evi-
dence of polygraph examinations is not arbitrary or disproportionate to serving the 
legitimate interests of ensuring that only reliable evidence is introduced at trial, pre-
serving the jury's role in determining credibility, and avoiding litigation that is collat-
eral to the primary purpose of the trial). 
85 See Lucas, 500 US. at 153. The Court reversed the Michigan Court of Appeals' 
per se rule that the notice requirement in Michigan's rape shield law violated the 
Sixth Amendment in all cases where it was used to preclude evidence of past sexual 
conduct between a rape victim and a criminal defendant. See id. at 146, 149-153. The 
Lucas Court recognized that in appropriate cases, criminal defendants' Sixth Amend-
ment right to present relevant testimony may bow to accommodate other legitimate 
interests in the criminal trial process. See id. at 149. 
86 See id. at 150. The Court also found that the statute protects against surprise 
to the prosecution. Id. Moreover, the notice and hearing procedure contained in the 
rape shield statute allows the trial court to determine in advance of trial whether the 
evidence is material and whether its prejudicial nature outweighs its probative value. 
See Lucas, 500 US. at 150. 
87 See id. 
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guilt.88 Several Court cases have addressed the effect of rape 
shield statutes on a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment 
compulsory process rights.89 
In Taylor v. Illinois,90 the Court considered whether a 
court order precluding a defense witness' testimony as a sanc-
tion, because defense counsel failed to comply with a discov-
ery rule, violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment compul-
sory process rights.91 In Taylor, defense counsel failed to list a 
witness in response to the state's pretrial discovery request 
and the trial judge refused to allow the undisclosed witness to 
testify.92 The Court held that the lower court did not commit 
constitutional error. 93 The Court acknowledged that the 
defendant's right to present witnesses in his own defense is 
essential to the adversary system itself.94_However, a criminal 
defendant does not have the unfettered right to offer testi-
mony that is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissi-
ble under standard rules of evidence.95 Considering the doubt-
ful veracity of the witness' testimony, the Court found that 
precluding the defense witness from testifying constituted an 
appropriate sanction for counsel's violation of the discovery 
rules and did not violate compulsory process.96 
88 See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
89 See generally Taylor v. Illinois, 484 US. 400, 401 (1988) and Crane, 476 US. at 
684. 
90 484 U.S. 400 (1988). 
91 See id. at 401-402. 
92 See id. 
93 See id. at 402. The Taylor Court found that preclusion of the witness' testi-
mony as a sanction for a discovery violation is not absolutely prohibited by the Com-
pulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment. [d. 
94 See Taylor, 484 U.S. at 408-409 (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 US. 683, 
709 (1974». The Taylor Court reasoned that because this country has elected to em-
ploy an adversary system of criminal justice in which the parties contest all issues 
before a court of law, the need to develop all relevant facts in this system is both fun-
damental and comprehensive. [d. The Court also found that the function of the courts 
requires that compulsory process be available for the production of evidence, needed 
either by the prosecution or the defense. [d. Furthermore, the integrity of the judicial 
system and public confidence in the system depend on full disclosure of all the facts 
within the framework of the rules of evidence. [d. 
95 See id. at 410. 
98 See Taylor, 484 US. at 416-417. The Court doubted the veracity of the undis-
closed witness' testimony because he was proffered by the defense as an eyewitness, 
however, his testimony outside the presence of the jury dramatically contradicted de-
fense counsel's representations to the trial court. [d. at 404-405. 
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Similarly in Crane v. Kentucky, 97 the Court addressed 
whether the Sixth Amendment Compulsory Process Clause 
had been violated.98 Crane sought to introduce evidence of the 
circumstances surrounding his confession to cast doubt on the 
validity and credibility of his confession.99 The Court relied on 
prior decisions to re-state the long-standing rule that the Con-
stitution guarantees criminal defendants a meaningful oppor-
tunity to present a complete defense.lOo Accordingly, exclusion 
of this kind of exculpatory evidence, in the absence of any 
valid state justification, deprived the defendant of the right to 
test the prosecutor's case through the presentation of all rele-
vant evidence.lol 
97 476 u.s. 683 (1986). 
98 See id. at 684. In Crane, a unanimous Court reversed the decision of the Ken-
tucky Supreme Court, which had affirmed Crane's conviction, and remanded to the 
trial court to determine whether exclusion of the testimony was harmless error. [d. at 
691. 
99 See id. at 685. The trial court excluded evidence of the circumstances sur-
rounding the defendant's confession. See id. at 684. The trial court denied Crane's 
motion to suppress his confession to police having found that the confession was vol-
untary. See Crane, 476 U.S. at 685. Those circumstances were: he had been detained 
in a windowless room for a protracted period of time; he had been surrounded by as 
many as six police officers; he had repeatedly requested and been denied permission 
to telephone his mother; and he had been badgered into making a false confession. 
[d. The trial court refused to allow Crane to introduce evidence of these circum-
stances because the court rejected Crane's theory that the evidence was relevant to 
cast doubt on the validity and credibility of Crane's confession. [d. at 686. 
100 See id. at 690. A criminal defendant's constitutionally guaranteed right to 
present a complete defense is rooted in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment as well as in the Compulsory Process and Confrontation clauses of the 
Sixth Amendment. See generally Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 23 (1967); Davis v. 
Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974); California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984). See 
also infra text accompanying note 145. The Court stated that an essential component 
of procedural fairness is the opportunity to be heard. See Crane, 476 U.S. at 690. The 
Court further articulated that this opportunity would be empty if the State were al-
lowed to exclude competent, reliable evidence bearing on the credibility of a confes-
sion when such evidence is central to the defendant's claim of innocence. [d. 
101 See id. at 690-691. The Court found that criminal defendant's have the right 
to have the prosecutor's case encounter and "survive the crucible" of meaningful ad-
versarial testing, therefore, the exclusion of exculpatory evidence, in the absence of 
valid state justification, deprives a criminal defendant of this right. [d. 
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3. Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause 
The Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause ensures a 
criminal defendant the opportunity to cross-examine wit-
nesses testifying against him.102 The opportunity guaranteed 
to a criminal defendant to confront and cross-examine the 
witnesses against him is important in an adversarial system 
to produce a full and fair presentation of the facts.103 The 
right to cross-examine ensures that the evidence admitted 
against the accused is reliable and subject to the rigorous ad-
versarial testing that is a staple of American criminal pro-
ceedings. l04 The United States Supreme Court has fully ana-
lyzed this Sixth Amendment right in several cases.105 
In Pennsylvania v. Ritchie,106 the Court considered 
whether the trial court violated the Ritchie's right of cross-
examination by denying him information necessary to prepare 
his defense. 107 At trial, Ritchie sought disclosure of the alleged 
victim's Children and Youth Services file, on the grounds that 
the information in the file might contain the names of 
favorable witnesses, in addition to other unspecified exculpa-
tory evidence. lOB The trial judge refused to order Children and 
Youth Services to disclose the files to the defendant.l09 In 
Ritchie, the Court analyzed whether the failure to disclose the 
contents of the file violated Ritchie's confrontation and com-
pulsory process rights. 110 The Court found that its own prece-
102 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 668 (citing Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 678-679 (1986)). 
See also supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
103 See Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 680. In Van Arsdall, the Court found that a rea-
sonable jury might have received a significantly different perspective of the witness' 
credibility if the trial court had allowed defense counsel to engage in appropriate 
cross-examination. See id. at 680. 
104 See Tague v. Richards, 3 F.3d 1133, 1138 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing Maryland v. 
Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 846 (1990)). 
105 See generally Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 39 and VanArsdall, 475 U.S. at 678. 
106 480 U.S. 39 (1987). 
107 See id. at 42-43. The Court in Ritchie addressed whether and to what extent a 
State's interest in the confidentiality of its investigative files concerning child abuse 
must yield to a criminal defendant's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to dis-
cover favorable evidence. Id. 
108 See id. at 44. 
109 See id. 
110 See Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 45. The Ritchie Court analyzed, under the Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process Clause, Ritchie's claim that the failure to disclose the con-
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dent establishes that the Compulsory Process Clause guaran-
tees that criminal defendants have the "right to the 
government's assistance in compelling the attendance of 
favorable witnesses at trial and the right to put before a jury 
evidence that might influence the determination of guilt."111 
Therefore, the Ritchie Court concluded that because defense 
counsel cross-examined all of the trial witnesses fully, the 
trial court's failure to disclose the file did not violate the 
defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause. ll2 
To the contrary in Delaware v. Van Arsdall,113 the Court 
found a violation of the Confrontation Clause.H4 The Court 
held that the trial court violated Van Arsdall's confrontation 
rights by prohibiting his inquiry into the possibility that a 
witness was biased as a result of the state's dismissal of that 
witness' pending public drunkenness charge.115 The Court fur-
ther stated that a trial judge may impose some limits on de-
fense counsel's inquiry into the potential bias of a prosecution 
witness, however, the trial judge may not prohibit all inquiry 
tents of the file violated his Sixth Amendment confrontation and compulsory process 
rights because the Sixth Amendment guarantees are applied to the states through 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. See infra note 115 and 
accompanying text. 
11l See Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 56. See generally Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 
284 (1973); Cool v. United States, 409 U.S. 100 (1972); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 
14 (1967). 
112 See Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 54. The Court emphasized that the Confrontation 
Clause guarantees the opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-
examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense 
might wish. Id. The Court explained that the Confrontation Clause guarantees a 
criminal defendant the opportunity for an effective cross-examination because this 
right "means more than being allowed to confront the witnesses physically." See 
VanArsdall, 475 U.S. at 678. The Court found that a defendant many not cross-
examine in any way he sees fit because the Confrontation Clause does not prohibit 
reasonable limits on cross-examination based on concerns about harassment, 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that is repeti-
tive or only marginally relevant. Id. at 679. 
113 475 U.S. 673 (1986). 
114 See id. at 679. 
115 See id. at 679. The Court found the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause 
guarantees a criminal defendant the right to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him as well as the opportunity"to cross-examine those witnesses. See id. at 
678 (citing Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-316 (1974». The Court also recognized 
that the exposure of a witness's motivation is a proper and important function of the 
constitutionally protected right of cross-examination." See id. at 678-679. 
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by defense counsel into the possible bias of a prosecution wit-
ness as the trial court did in Van Ardsall without violating 
the Confrontation Clause.1l6 Therefore, a trial judge's com-
plete prohibition of a criminal defendant's line of cross-
examination violates the Confrontation Clause.ll7 
Similarly, in Agard v. Portuondo,118 the Seventh Circuit 
addressed a criminal defendant's confrontation clause rights 
in the context of a trial court's denial of defense counsel's 
cross-examination under New York's rape shield law.119 In 
Agard, the trial court denied defense counsel's attempt to 
cross-examine the victim on whether she had ever engaged in 
anal intercourse with persons other than the defendant.12o 
The court ruled that the rape shield statute proscribed de-
fense counsel's inquiry into the victim's prior sexual history 
and that any probative value was far exceeded by the 
prejudice. 121 The court noted that a state might restrict a 
defendant's right to introduce evidence without violating the 
defendant's constitutional right to present a defense if the re-
strictions are neither arbitrary nor disproportionate to the 
purposes they are designed to serve.122 Accordingly, the court 
116 See VanArsdall, 475 US. at 679. The Court stressed that the Constitution en-
titles a defendant to a fair trial, not a perfect one. [d. at 681; See generally United 
States v. Hasting, 461 US. 499, 508-509 (1983); Bruton v. United States, 391 US. 
123, 135 (1968». 
117 See VanArsdall, 475 US. at 679. 
118 117 F.3d 696 (7th Cir. 1997). 
119 See id. at 702. 
120 See id. 
121 See id. The trial court also rejected Agard's request that the testimony be al-
lowed with a limiting instruction to the jury. [d. Agard asserted that the trial court's 
ruling violated his constitutional rights to confrontation and due process because it 
denied him the ability to present a complete defense. See Agard, 117 F.3d at 702. 
New York's rape shield law relied upon by the trial court in Agard, bars the use of 
evidence at trial of an alleged victim's prior sexual conduct with persons other than 
the defendant, but grants the trial court discretion to admit such evidence in the in-
terest of justice. [d. See generally N.Y. CRIM. !>Roc. LAw § 60.42 (McKinney 1992). 
However, this discretionary power granted to the trial court must be exercised within 
the boundaries of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. See Agard, 117 F.3d at 702. 
122 See Agard, 117 F.3d at 702. (citing Rock v. Arkansas, 483 US. 44, 55-56 
(1987». The court found that rape shield laws exemplified the trial court's traditional 
power to exclude evidence when the prejudicial character far exceeds its probative 
value. [d. at 703. The Seventh Circuit recognized that rape shield laws serve the pur-
pose of protecting victims of rape from harassment and embarrassment in court to 
encourage women to report these crimes. [d. The court found that rape shield laws 
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held that the trial court did not violate Agard's confrontation 
rights by limiting defense counsel's cross-examination of the 
victim because application of the rape shield statute was 
neither arbitrary nor disproportionate to the purposes it was 
designed to serve. 123 
The Seventh Circuit also addressed a defendant's confron-
tation clause rights in Tague v. Richards.124 In Tague, Tague 
claimed that application of Indiana's rape shield statute vio-
lated his Sixth Amendment confrontation rightS.125 Tague had 
been charged with molesting his neighbor AT., an eleven-year 
old girl. 126 On cross-examination of a state witness Dr. Hib-
bard, Tague sought to elicit testimony that AT. had told Dr. 
Hibbard that her father had molested her several years ear-
lier.127 The trial court excluded this testimony under Indiana's 
rape shield statute because it related to prior sexual acts in-
volving AT. 128 
also serve a second purpose of reinforcing the trial judge's traditional power to keep 
inflammatory and distracting evidence from the jury. 1d. 
123 See id. The court found that application of the rape shield statute was not ar-
bitrary or disproportionate because of the highly prejudicial nature of the evidence. 
See Agard, 117 F.3d at 703. The court recognized that evidence of more unusual sex-
ual activities, such as anal intercourse, is likely to distract a jury from the other evi-
dence it is asked to consider. 1d. Furthermore, the court concluded that the probative 
value of the evidence was low because "it is far from clear what bearing prior consen-
sual experience with a particular sexual practice has on the probability of trauma oc-
curring during a subsequent non-consensual act." 1d. 
124 3 F.3d 1133, 1135 (7th Cir. 1993). 
125 See id. at 1135. 
126 See id. at 1136. 
127 See id. Dr. Hibbard, a prosecution witness, had interviewed and physically ex-
amined AT. 1d. Dr. Hibbard's examination of AT. revealed that there was extra tis-
sue on AT's hymen and she was infected with gardnella vaginitis, a disease rarely 
found in children and thought to be sexually transmitted. See Tague, 3 F.3d at 1136. 
Dr. Hibbard also testified that vaginal discharge, the main symptom of the disease, 
surfaced around the time of the alleged attacks by Tague and Dr. Hibbard concluded 
that AT. was most likely a victim of sexual abuse. 1d. However, Dr. Hibbard also tes-
tified that she could not determine if the hymenal damage occurred three months or 
three years before the examination and that other possible, but unlikely, causes of 
damage existed. 1d. 
128 See id. at 1137. Indiana Code § 35-37-4-4, Indiana's rape shield statute, pro-
hibits a criminal defendant from introducing any evidence of the victim's past sexual 
conduct in his defense against a sex crime charge, with the exception of evidence: (1) 
of the victim's or a witness' past sexual conduct with the defendant; (2) which in a 
specific instance of sexual activity shows that some person other than the defendant 
committed the act upon which the prosecution is founded; or (3) that the victim's 
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However, the court agreed with Tague that application of 
Indiana's rape shield statute to exclude the testimony violated 
his confrontation rights. 129 The court recognized that the gen-
eral purpose of rape shield statutes is to exclude evidence 
that, although relevant, has little probative value and a great 
capacity to embarrass and distract. l3o The court acknowledged 
that eliminating the risk of embarrassment furthers the 
state's interest in encouraging children to report cases of mo-
lestation.131 Nevertheless, the court found that the state's in-
terest did not outweigh Tague's constitutional right to cross-
examine and thereby challenge the medical evidence offered 
by the state through Dr. Hibbard's testimony.132 
Likewise, in Wood v. Alaska,133 the Ninth Circuit consid-
ered whether the trial court's exclusion of evidence about the 
pregnancy at the time of trial was not caused by the defendant. See IND. CODE § 35-
37-4-4'(a)-(b). The Indiana Supreme Court upheld the trial court's determination that 
the evidence regarding A.T.'s molestation by her father did not fall within any of the 
exceptions contained in Indiana's rape shield statute. See Tague, 3 F.3d at 1137. 
129 See Tague, 3 F.3d at 1138. The Seventh Circuit found that application of the 
rape shield statute under the circumstances in this case excluded evidence that indi-
cated another possible source of the victim's hymenal damage, thereby significantly 
hampering Tague's efforts to rebut the inferences the state asked the jury to draw 
from the direct testimony of Dr. Hibbard. [d. 
130 See id. at 1139. The Seventh Circuit also recognized that the type of evidence 
excluded by rape shield statutes is considered to shift the balance of proof too far in 
favor of the rape defendant. [d. The court also found that Indiana's rape shield stat-
ute was enacted to prevent a general inquiry into the past sexual conduct of the vic-
tim to avoid embarrassing the victim and subjecting her to possible public denigra-
tion. [d. (citing Kelly v. State, 586 N.E. 2d 927, 929 (Ind. App. 1992». 
131 See Tague, 3 F.3d at 1139. 
132 See id. Although the Seventh Circuit found that exclusion of the evidence vio-
lated Tague's Sixth Amendment confrontation rights, the court did not grant habeas 
relief because, in light of the other evidence at trial, the error did not have a sub-
stantial and injurious effect or influence on his trial. [d. at 1140. The court found 
that the victim testified with great detail about the occasions on which Tague at-
tacked her and A.T.'s credibility and allegations were reinforced by the testimony of 
her mother, her school counselor, and the welfare department caseworker. [d. Fur-
thermore, the court found that the evidence of A.T.'s infection with gardnella vaginitis 
supported her allegations that Tague molested her in the summer of 1986 because 
vaginal discharge, a symptom of the disease, appeared several months before A.T's 
examination in January 1987. [d. Accordingly, the court determined that the in-
fringement on Tague's Sixth Amendment rights was harmless because exclusion of 
the evidence did not substantially prejudice the result of his trial. See Tague, 3 F.3d 
at 1140 
133 957 F.2d 1544 (9th Cir. 1992). 
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victim in a rape trial violated the defendant's Sixth Amend-
ment confrontation rights. 134 In Wood, the trial court excluded 
evidence that the victim had posed in Penthouse magazine, 
had acted in X-rated movies, had shown Wood the photo-
graphs and had discussed her experiences with Tague.135 The 
court recognized that although a criminal defendant's Sixth 
Amendment rights guarantee him the ability to confront and 
cross-examine witnesses against him and to present a de-
fense, those rights do not give him the right to present irrele-
vant evidence.136 The court· also found that trial courts retain 
the discretionary power to impose reasonable limits on cross-
examination to prevent harassment, prejudice and confusion 
of the issues among other things. 137 Thus, the Ninth Circuit 
concluded that exclusion of the evidence did not violate 
Wood's Sixth Amendment confrontation rights because the low 
probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed 
by its prejudicial effect.138 
In United States v. Payne,139 the Ninth Circuit also consid-
ered whether the trial court's exclusion of evidence under the 
federal rape shield statute violated Payne's Sixth Amendment 
confrontation rights. 140 The court examined the probative 
134 See id. at 1545-1546. 
136 See id. at 1547. The Ninth Circuit agreed that the evidence that the victim 
posed in Penthouse and acted in pornographic movies was not relevant in itself. Id. 
at 1551. However, the Ninth Circuit found that the fact that she showed Wood the 
photos and discussed her acting experiences with him was relevant to establish the 
nature of their relationship. Id. 
136 See Wood, 957 F.2d at 1549. Relevant evidence consists of any evidence that 
has any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of importance more or less 
probable than it would be without the evidence. See generally FED. R. EVID. 401. 
137 See Wood, 957 F.2d at 1549. 
138 See id. at 1552-1554. See also infra Part IV.C.l. The court found that the pro-
bative value of the evidence was low because introducing the evidence would confuse 
the issues and unduly prejudice the jury. See Wood, 957 F.2d at 1552. Furthermore 
the court found that because the victim's acting and modeling experiences were not 
relevant in themselves, the jury could be led to base its decision on irrelevant facts. 
Id. The court concluded that the evidence was highly prejudicial because if the jury 
considered the evidence it could feel hostility for the victim as an immoral woman 
and base its decision on that hostility rather than the facts. Id. The court also feared 
that the jury could conclude that a woman with the victim's past could not be raped 
or that she somehow deserved to be raped. Id. at 1552-1553. 
139 944 F.2d 1458 (9th Cir. 1991). 
140 See id. at 1469. The alleged victim was Payne's 12-year old foster daughter. 
See id. at 1462. The trial court excluded evidence of the victim's past sexual conduct, 
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value of the prohibited cross-examination to determine 
whether Payne's confrontation rights had been violated.141 The 
court reasoned that the evidence that Payne sought to elicit 
on cross-examination was of minimal probative to his claim 
about the victim's bias against him.142 Therefore, the Ninth 
Circuit concluded that the trial court appropriately excluded 
the evidence because the incident had minimal, if any proba-
tive value that was outweighed by the potential prejudicial ef-
fect to the young victim.143 Accordingly, exclusion of the evi-
dence did not violate Payne's Sixth Amendment confrontation 
rights. 144 
4. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause 
The United States Supreme Court has held that the Four-
teenth Amendment Due Process requires that the judicial pro-
cess protect those rights that are the "very essence of the 
scheme of ordered liberty" or are "implicit in the concept of or-
dered liberty."145 Due Process guarantees criminal defendants 
specifically that she had been found in a trailer, partially undressed, engaging in 
heavy petting with a boy. See id. at 1468. Payne contended that the evidence was ad-
missible to show: (1) the victim's motivation to testify falsely against Payne based on 
discipline arising out of the trailer incident; (2) to demonstrate the victim's lack of 
credibility because of her allegedly inconsistent recounting of the incident; (3) to ex-
plain the medical evidence regarding the condition of the victim's hymen; and (4) to 
rebut testimony suggesting that the victim was a virgin. [d. at 1468-1469. 
141 See Payne, 944 F.2d at 1469. 
142 See id. The court further noted that the trial court prohibited a "sanitized 
cross-examination" about the trailer incident because the underlying facts of the inci-
dent were not relevant to the victim's purported motivation to fabricate the charges 
against Payne. See id. Furthermore, the court found that evidence of the incident was 
more prejudicial than probative regarding the issue of the medical evidence because 
Payne did not establish that any activity that took place during the incident could of-
fer an alternative explanation of the medical evidence. [d. 
143 See id. 
1« See Payne, 944 F.2d at 1469. See also infra Part V.A. 
145 See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324-326 (1937). In LaJoie, the Ninth 
Circuit limited its analysis to LaJoie's Sixth Amendment constitutional rights be-
cause the United States Supreme Court has held that whether rooted directly in the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, or in the Compulsory Process or 
Confrontation clauses of the Sixth Amendment, the Constitution guarantees criminal 
defendants a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense. See LaJoie, 217 
F.3d at 668 (citing Crane, 476 U.S. at 690). See also supra note 4 and accompanying 
text. 
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that convictions are not brought about by methods that offend 
a sense of justice. 146 
These important principles derive from the Court's deci-
sion in Rochin u. California. 147 In Rochin, the Court consid-
ered whether use of evidence, which had been forcibly ob-
tained from the person of Rochin, to convict Rochin violated 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.148 The 
deputy sheriffs directed a physician at a hospital to pump 
Rochin's stomach, without his consent, to recover two capsules 
containing morphine that the defendant had swallowed in the 
deputy's presence.149 The prosecutors used the capsules at 
trial to obtain Rochin's conviction for illegal possession of 
morphine.150 The Court stated that the Due Process Clause re-
quires the government to respect those personal rights that 
are so rooted in the traditions and conscience of the people of 
this Nation as to be considered fundamenta1. 151 Although the 
Court did not articulate a more precise definition of due pro-
cess, the Court stated that due process means that convictions 
cannot be brought about by methods that offend a sense of 
justice.152 Accordingly, the Court determined that the method 
used to obtain the capsules offended a sense of justice, there-
fore, Rochin's due process rights had been violated by use of 
the capsules to obtain his conviction.153 
146 See Rochin v. California, 342 US. 165, 173 (1952). 
147 342 US. 165, 173 (1952). 
148 See id. at 166-168. 
149 See id. at 166. 
150 See id. 
151 See id. at 169. These fundamental rights include: the right to have an abor-
tion, Roe v. Wade, 410 US. 113, 152-154 (1973); and the right to marry, Loving v. Vir-
ginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) and Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 US. 374, 383 (1978). In 
Rochin, the officer's cO,nduct violated Rochin's right to be free from unwanted and un-
warranted intrusions into the privacy of his body. See Rochin, 342 US. at 172-174. 
152 See Rochin, 342 US. at 173. Because due process of law is a historic and gen-
erative principle, it "precludes defining, and thereby confining, these standards of 
conduct more precisely than to say that convictions cannot be brought about by meth-
ods that offend a "sense of justice." [d. 
153 See id. at 173-174. The Court concluded that the proceedings by which 
Rochin's conviction was obtained did "more than offend some fastidious squeamish-
ness or private sentimentalism about combating crime too energetically." [d. at 172. 
The Court found that the officer's conduct shocks the conscience. [d. The officer's 
course of conduct which consisted of "illegally breaking into the privacy of the peti-
tioner [Rochin], the struggle to open his mouth and remove what was there, [and] the 
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IV. NINTH CIRCUIT'S ANALYSIS 
In LaJoie v. Thompson,154 the Ninth Circuit considered 
whether suppressing evidence of the victim's past sexual 
abuse, for failure to give the required 15-day notice of intent 
to introduce such evidence,155 violated LaJoie's Constitutional 
rights.156 The court noted that Fourteenth Amendment and 
Sixth Amendment constitutional jurisprudence guarantees 
criminal defendants a meaningful opportunity to present a 
complete defense.157 It evaluated LaJoie's appeal of the district· 
court's denial of his petition for a writ of habeas COrpUS158 in 
light of clearly established Sixth Amendment jurisprudence 
and determined that exclusion of the evidence violated La-
Joie's Sixth Amendment compulsory process and confrontation 
forcible extraction of his stomach's contents . . . to obtain evidence is bound to offend 
even hardened sensibilities." See Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172. The Court described the of-
ficer's methods as "too close to the rack and the screw to permit of constitutional dif-
ferentiation." [d. 
154 217 F.3d 663 (9th Cir. 2000). 
165 See supra note 15 and accompanying text. LaJoie noticed his intent to present 
evidence of VN's past history of sexual abuse by other only 7 days in advance of trial, 
8 days late under Rule 412's notice requirement. See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 674, Moreo-
ver, because LaJoie's attorney learned of the evidence well in advance of the notice 
deadline, LaJoie did not meet the exceptions to the notice requirement under Rule 
412(4)(a)(3). [d. 
156 See id. at 667. LaJoie claimed that the trial court's exclusion of evidence of 
the victim's past history of sexual abuse by others under Rule 412, violated his Four-
teenth Amendment Due Process rights. [d. LaJoie further claimed that exclusion of 
the evidence violated his Sixth Amendment Compulsory Process and Confrontation 
Clause rights. [d. A criminal defendant is guaranteed, under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment Due Process Clause and the Sixth Amendment Confrontation and Compulsory 
Process clauses, to put before the jury evidence that might influence the determina-
tion of guilt and to have a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense. See 
supra notes 23-4 and accompanying text. 
157 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 668 (citing Crane, 476 U.S. at 690). See also supra 
Parts III.B.2-III.BA. 
158 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 667. The Ninth Circuit noted that it reviews questions 
of law such as a district court's decision to grant or deny a §2254 habeas petition de 
novo. See id. at 667-668. Under the de novo standard of review, the court considers 
the issues before it anew. See generally BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 435 (6th ed. 1990). 
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the determination of what is "clearly estab-
lished federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," under 
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), as a question of law which must be decided de novo. See La-
Joie, 217 F.3d at 667 (citing Canales v. Roe, 151 F.3d 1226, 1228-1229 (9th Cir. 
1998)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(I). 
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clause rights. 159 Accordingly, the court's'majority opinion held 
that the district court erred in denying LaJoie's petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus. 160 Judge Ferguson authored a dissent-
ing opinion. 161 
A. CRIMINAL DEFENDANT'S DUE PROCESS, CONFRONTATION AND 
COMPULSORY PROCESS RIGHTS 
The Ninth Circuit emphasized that criminal defendants' 
right to a meaningful opportunity to present a complete de-
fense is the same whether it is rooted in the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or in the Compulsory 
Process or Confrontation clauses of the Sixth Amendment.162 
The Ninth Circuit then discussed the constitutional ratio-
nale underlying the Compulsory Process and Confrontation 
clauses of the Sixth Amendment.163 The court found that the 
Compulsory Process Clause mandates that criminal defend-
ants have the right to the government's assistance in compel-
ling the attendance of favorable witnesses at trial as well as 
the right to put before a jury evidence that might influence 
the determination of guilt. 164 Furthermore, the court reasoned 
that the ends of criminal justice are not served if judgments 
are not founded on a full presentation of the facts. 165 The 
court further recognized that the Confrontation Clause of the 
Sixth Amendment ensures a criminal defendant the opportu-
nity to cross-examine witnesses testifying against him.166 
159 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 673. 
160 See id. See supra also note 29 and accompanying text. 
161 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 673. 
162 See id. at 668 (citing Crane, 476 U.S. at 690). See also supra note 145 and ac-
companying text. 
163 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 668. 
164 See id. The Ninth Circuit looked to the Court's decision in. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 
at 56, to determine the minimum rights guaranteed by the Compulsory Process 
Clause of the Sixth Amendment. See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 668. See also supra Part 
III.B.3. 
165 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 668. The Ninth Circuit quoted Taylor, 484 U.S. at 411, 
in which the Supreme Court articulated that the "ends of criminal justice would be 
defeated if judgments were to be founded on a partial or speculative presentation of 
the facts." See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 668. See also Taylor, 484 U.S. at 411; supra Part 
III.B.2. 
166 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 668. The Ninth Circuit looked to the Court's decision 
in Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 678-679, in articulating criminal defendants' constitu-
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The Ninth Circuit stated that restrictions placed on a 
criminal defendant's right to present a complete defense, to 
put before the jury evidence that might influence the determi-
nation of guilt, and to confront witnesses may not be arbi-
trary or disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to 
serve.167 The court noted that a criminal defendant's failure to 
comply with a rape shield law's notice requirement might in 
some cases justify the severe sanction of preclusion of the evi-
dence.16S However, it emphasized that whether a rape shield 
law's notice requirement justifies the severe sanction of pre-
clusion must be determined by the courts on a case-by-case 
basis by balancing the relevance of the evidence with the in-
terests served by the notice requirement. 169 
The Ninth Circuit scrutinized the Oregon Supreme 
tional right to cross-examine witnesses testifying against him. See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 
668. See also supra Part III.B.3. 
167 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 668. The Ninth Circuit relied on the Court's decision 
in Lucas, 500 U.S. at 146, 149-153, for the controlling constitutional Supreme Court 
precedent to determine whether the trial court unconstitutionally excluded the evi-
dence under Rule 412, Oregon's rape shield statute, for failure to meet Rule 412's 15-
day notice requirement. See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 668. See also supra notes 84-85 and 
accompanying text. 
168 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 668-669. See also Lucas, 500 U.S. at 153. The Court in 
Lucas noted that this rule does not mean that all notice requirements pass constitu-
tional muster. See Lucas, 500 U.S. at 151. Only notice requirements that are arbi-
trary or disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve will not pass con-
stitutional muster. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. The Court upheld a 
Florida rule that required a criminal defendant to notify the State in advance of trial 
of any alibi witness that he intended to call. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 84 
(1970). The Court stated that the notice requirement in no way affected the defend-
ant's decision to call alibi witnesses, rather, the rule only compelled the defendant to 
accelerate the timing~ of his disclosure. Id. at 85. The Court emphasized that acceler-
ating the disclosure of the evidence did not violate a defendant's constitutional rights 
because "a criminal trial is not a poker game in which players enjoy an absolute right 
always to conceal their cards until played." Id. at 82. Similarly, in Wardius v. Oregon, 
412 U.S. 470, 474 (1973), the Court described notice requirements as "a salutary de-
velopment that, by increasing the evidence available to both parties, enhances the 
fairness of the adversary system." See Wardius, 412 U.S. at 474. 
169 See LaJoie, 217 U.S. at 669. The Ninth Circuit cited other Circuit Courts and 
state court decisions that demonstrate that Lucas requires case-by-case balancing. Id. 
(citing Wood, 957 F.2d at 1551-1554; Agard, 117 F.3d at 703; Stephens v. Miller, 13 
F.3d 998, 1001 (7th Cir. 1994); State v. Cuni, 159 N.J. 584, 733 A.2d 414, 422 (1999); 
State v. Johnson, 123 N.M. 640, 944 P.2d 869, 876-878 (1997); People v. Lucas, 193 
Mich. App. 298, 484 N.W. 2d 685, 687 (1992». 
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Court's application of the Lucas test. 170 It held that the Ore-
gon Supreme Court misapplied the Lucas test by finding that 
the trial court's preclusion of the evidence did not violate La-
Joie's Sixth Amendment Confrontation and Compulsory Pro-
cess rights. l7l The court determined that although the Oregon 
Supreme Court utilized the correct rule from Lucas,172 the Or-
egon Supreme Court misapplied that rule to LaJoie's case.173 
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the Oregon 
Supreme Court erred in its determination about whether the 
purposes of Oregon's rape shield law and its notice require-
ment justified preclusion as a sanction for non-compliance 
with the notice provision.174 The court stated that had the Or-
egon Supreme Court properly applied the Lucas balancing 
test, that court only could have reasonably reached one con-
clusion: that the preclusion of the evidence of VN's past sex-
ual abuse by others was extreme and violated LaJoie's Sixth 
Amendment rightS.175 
170 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 670. The Lucas test provides that restrictions on a 
criminal defendant's right to confront witnesses and to present relevant evidence may 
not be "arbitrary or disproportionate" to the purposes they are designed to serve. See 
Lucas, 500 U.S. at 151. 
171 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 670. The Oregon Supreme Court upheld the trial 
court's exclusion of evidence of VN's past sexual abuse by others. See LaJoie, 849 P.2d 
at 490. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
172 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 670. The Court held in Lucas that preclusion of evi-
dence for violation of notice requirements of rape shield laws does not violate the 
Sixth Amendment if such a sanction is neither arbitrary nor disproportionate to the 
purposes of the notice requirement. See Lucas, 500 U.S. at 151. 
173 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 670. The Ninth Circuit stated that the Oregon Su-
preme Court articulated that Rule 412's notice requirement was designed to prevent 
surprise to the prosecution and the alleged victim, avoid undue trial delay, and pro-
tect the alleged victim from needless anxiety concerning the scope of the evidence to 
be produced at trial. [d. See also LaJoie, 849 P.2d at 489. The Ninth Circuit also 
found that the Oregon Supreme Court improperly concluded that the notice require-
ment was not arbitrary or disproportionate with respect to these intended purposes 
because the Oregon Supreme Court never considered or balanced the interests in La-
Joie's particular case. See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 670. Rather, the Ninth Circuit found 
that the Oregon Supreme Court determined that the balancing of the rights of de-
fendants generally with the legitimate purposes of the notice requirement was inher-
ent in the rule itself. [d. This, the Ninth Circuit held, constituted improper applica-
tion of clearly established federal law as required by the Lucas test. [d. 
174 See id. 
175 See id. at 671. The Ninth Circuit found that the Oregon Supreme Court's con-
clusion was not objectively reasonable because of the highly probative value of the ev-
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In balancing LaJoie's interests in presenting the evidence 
against the interests served by Rule 412's notice requirement, 
the Ninth Circuit found that none of the interests justifying 
the notice requirement of Rule 412 would have been abridged 
had LaJoie been allowed to use the evidence.176 The court de-
termined that the probative value of the evidence in LaJoie's 
case disproportionately outweighed the purposes of Rule 412's 
notice requirement, and that the evidence would not be un-
duly prejudicial,177 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit concluded 
idence that LaJoie sought to introduce under Rule 412. See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 671. 
Specifically, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the trial judge that the evidence that Wat-
kins had been convicted of raping VN was relevant to provide an alternative explana-
tion of the medical evidence offered by the State regarding injuries to VN's hymen, 
which invited the inference that LaJoie must have caused those injuries. [d. The 
Ninth Circuit further found that· LaJoie could have presented evidence of the other 
sexual abuse to offer an alternative explanation for VN's hymenal injuries. [d. The 
Ninth Circuit also found that evidence about Watkin's conviction for raping VN was 
relevant to show an alternative source for VN's knowledge about sexual acts and 
male genitalia, other than through rape by LaJoie. [d. The Ninth Circuit concluded 
that had the evidence been admitted, the jury could have drawn the conclusion from 
this evidence that VN had obtained her sexual knowledge from her abuse by Wat-
kins. [d. at 672. 
176 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 672. The Ninth Circuit evaluated the three interests 
served by Rule 412's notice requirement, which the Oregon Supreme Court relied 
upon in its analysis. See id. See supra notes 75, 76 and accompanying text. 
177 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 672. The court may exclude relevant evidence if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confu-
sion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste 
of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. FED. R. EVID. 403. The 
Ninth Circuit held that the purposes of allowing time for the evidence to be carefully 
screened and avoiding undue trial delay would not have been affected by admission 
of the evidence in LaJoie's case because the trial court was able to screen the evi-
dence within the time available and was able to decide which portions of the file were 
relevant. See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 672. The prosecutor had arguments prepared two 
days after LaJoie filed his notice of intent to present the evidence for the hearing on 
why the evidence should be excluded. [d. Therefore, the Court's consideration of the 
prejudicial quality of the evidence would not have resulted in undue trial delay. [d. 
The Ninth Circuit also stated that the interest in preventing unfair surprise was not 
implicated in LaJoie's case because the prosecutor had just finished trying the rape 
case of Watkins and was fully familiar with all the details of VN's CSD case file and 
with all the details of VN's past sexual abuse. [d. The Ninth Circuit also found it per-
suasive that there existed no evidence that LaJoie's failure to give the 15 days' notice 
was willful or strategic, rather than neglectful. [d. The Ninth Circuit further recog-
nized that although a State's interest in the protection of minor victims of sex crime 
from further trauma and embarrassment is a compelling one, in LaJoie's case this in-
terest was outweighed by the high probative value of the excluded evidence. See La-
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that the trial court violated LaJoie's Sixth Amendment rights 
since preclusion of the evidence was arbitrary and dispropor-
tionate to the purposes behind the 15-day notice 
requirement.17s 
B. HABEAS CORPUS 
Once the Ninth Circuit decided that the Oregon Supreme 
Court violated LaJoie's Sixth Amendment rights, the court 
looked at whether the error warranted habeas corpus relief.179 
The court applied the "unreasonable application" test. ISO The 
court looked at whether the Oregon Supreme Court's decision 
that upheld the trial court's preclusion of the evidence, 
amounted to an unreasonable application of clearly estab-
lished Federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of 
the United States. lSI In a federal habeas proceeding, the court 
Joie, 217 F.3d at 672. Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit determined that the excluded 
evidence had little potential for being unduly prejudicial to the VN, the alleged vic-
tim, because the evidence concerned non-consensual sexual abuse of a young child, 
therefore, the jury would be unlikely to draw an unfavorable and unwarranted im-
pression of the alleged victim, VN. [d. at 673. 
178 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 673. See also supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
179 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 673. The Ninth Circuit focused on whether the district 
court erred in denying LaJoie's petition for a writ of habeas corpus based on the dis-
trict court's conclusion that the Oregon Supreme Court's decision was not an unrea-
sonable application of clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme 
Court of the United States. [d. The Court of Appeals reviews de novo a district 
court's decision to grant or deny a habeas petition. See Eslaminia v. White, 136 F.3d 
1234, 1236 (9th Cir. 1998). A federal court may grant a writ of habeas corpus is the 
relevant state-court decision was either: (1) contrary to clearly established Federal 
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) involved an un-
reasonable application of clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Su-
preme Court of the United States. See Taylor, 529 U.S. at 428; AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. § 
2254(d)(l). A state court's decision can be contrary to federal law either, 1) if it fails 
to apply the correct controlling authority, or 2) if it applies the controlling authority 
to a case involving facts "materially indistinguishable" from those in the controlling 
case but nonetheless reaches a different result. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 428-429. A 
state court's decision can involve an unreasonable application of federal law if it ei-
ther: 1) correctly identifies the governing rule but then applies it to a new set of facts 
in a way that is objectively unreasonable, or 2) extends or fails to extend a clearly es-
tablished legal principle to a new context in a way that is objectively unreasonable. 
[d. See also supra Parts III.A.1-III.A.3. 
180 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 673; Williams, 529 U.S. at 429. See also supra Part 
III.A.2; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 
181 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 673. 
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must also determine whether the State court's error had a 
substantial and injurious effect or influence on the jury's 
verdict. 182 
The Ninth Circuit concluded that even had the Oregon 
Supreme Court properly applied the Lucas test to the circum-
stances in LaJoie's case, the Oregon Supreme Court's decision 
amounted· to an unreasonable application of clearly estab-
lished Federal law as espoused by the Supreme Court of the 
United States.183 The court further held that the exclusion of 
the evidence seriously damaged LaJoie's defense because the 
jury heard only that part of the story that implicated LaJoie 
and not the highly probative evidence of the past sexual 
abuse that VN had experienced.184 Accordingly, the court held 
that the district court erred in holding that the Oregon Su-
preme Court's decision was a reasonable application of clearly 
established United States Supreme Court precedent, and 
182 See id. The Ninth Circuit looked to United States Supreme Court authority to 
determine the standard for whether habeas relief must be granted in a federal 
habeas proceeding: whether the court's error had "substantial and injurious effect or 
influence in determining the jury's verdict." See id. (citing Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623). 
183 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 673. The clearly established federal law applied by the 
Ninth Circuit and the Oregon Supreme Court to LaJoie's case was the Lucas test: 
preclusion of evidence for violation of notice requirements of rape shield laws does 
not violate the Sixth Amendment if such a sanction is neither arbitrary nor dispro-
portionate to the purposes of the notice requirement. [d. See also Lucas, 500 U.S. at 
151. Clearly established federal law requires that courts undertake case-by-case bal-
ancing of the defendant's rights against those of the State and the victim under the 
Lucas test. See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 669. See also supra note 84 and accompanying 
text. The Ninth Circuit did not consider whether the Oregon Supreme Court's appli-
cation of the Lucas test was contrary to clearly established federal law because they 
concluded that it was an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. 
See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 669 n.13. 
184 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 673. The Ninth Circuit agreed with LaJoie's conten-
tion that the jury convicted him without the benefit of the evidence of the past sexual 
abuse that the jury could have determined was exculpatory because, in several ways, 
it tended to make it less likely that LaJoie had raped and sexually abused VN. [d. 
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit concluded that exclusion of the evidence by the trial 
court had a substantial and injurious effect on the jury's verdict. [d. The excluded ev-
idence which the jury could have found exculpatory was that: (1) Russell Watkins, 
one of VN's mother's boyfriends, had been convicted of raping VN which was relevant 
to rebut or explain the State's evidence of VN's hymenal injuries and to provide an 
alternate source of VN's ability to explain sexual acts; and (2) certain evidence was 
relevant to show the alleged motive or bias of VN because it tended to show that 
VN's allegations were false and were invited by CSD caseworkers. [d. at 666. See also 
supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
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therefore, erred in denying LaJoie's petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus. 185 
c. DISSENTING OPINION 
Judge Ferguson dissented, stating that the majority made 
several fundamental errors. 18G First, he opined that the major-
ity incorrectly determined that the evidence, which LaJoie 
sought to put before the jury, constituted relevant evidence.187 
Second, he believed that the majority incorrectly determined 
that LaJoie's interests in introducing the evidence outweighed 
those of the State in precluding it.188 Third, he found that the 
majority opinion improperly carved out an exception to a rape 
shield statute's notice requirement whenever a defendant vic-
185 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 674. 
186 See id. Judge Ferguson began his dissent with a discussion of VN's history of 
sexual abuse from the time she was two until the time she was in the second grade 
and went to live with her aunt and LaJoie at his isolated farm. See id. The dissent 
also described in detail the abuse that VN claimed she suffered at the hands of La-
Joie almost every night. See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 674. 
187 See id. The dissenting opinion also discussed the evidence of five separate in-
cidents of sexual abuse suffered by VN excluded by the trial court that LaJoie sought 
to introduce as evidence. [d. These five incidents were: (1) a teenaged boy had pulled 
down her pants once when she was five; (2) a man had sexually assaulted VN's 
brother; (3) her brother had inserted a plastic knife into her anus when she was 
three; (4) a relative had touched her genitals when she was about five; and (5) her 
mother's boyfriend had raped VN once when she was about eight. [d. at 675. LaJoie 
argued that this evidence would give the jury an alternative explanation for both the 
condition of VN's hymen and what LaJoie deemed her sophisticated awareness of sex-
ual terminology. [d. 
188 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 674. Judge Ferguson described the trial court's deter-
minations during the in camera hearing regarding the evidence that LaJoie sought to 
introduce under Rule 412. [d. at 675. He discussed the trial court's reasons for ex-
cluding the evidence which were: (1) the evidence was irrelevant and confusing; and 
(2) LaJoie had missed the deadline under Rule 412 and did not meet the exception 
under Rule 412- because the evidence was known to the defense well in advance of 
the notice deadline. [d. Specifically, the trial judge stated, "[llet's narrow it to [the 
mother's boyfriendl. I don't think the other stuff is, first of all, relevant to this case, 
specifically when we go back years beyond." See id. The trial judge further ruled that 
even the evidence about the rape by VN's mother's boyfriend was too confusing to 
come before the jury on the issue of VN's awareness of sexual terminology. [d. AB the 
trial judge explained, "I find that the information, if relevant, is in this situation so 
confusing as to the issue of crimes of Mr. LaJoie, as not to be admissible. 1 want to 
steer away from these matters involving [the mother's boyfriendl." See LaJoie, 217 
F.3d at 675. 
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timizes a child.189 Finally, he found that even if the majority 
correctly determined that the state courts committed constitu-
tional error by excluding the evidence, the majority incor-
rectly identified the error as one that warranted habeas 
relief. 190 
Judge Ferguson engaged in a two-part inquiry to deter-
mine the constitutionality of the exclusion of the evidence: (1) 
whether the evidence was relevant and (2) whether the 
State's interest in excluding the evidence outweighed LaJoie's 
interests in presenting it.191 He analyzed the same issue ad-
dressed in the majority opinion, whether exclusion of the evi-
dence LaJoie sought to put before the jury violated his Sixth 
Amendment Confrontation and Compulsory Process Clause 
rights. 192 
1. Lack of Relevant Evidence 
Judge Ferguson's dissent asserted that the majority im-
properly held that the evidence, which LaJoie sought to intro-
189 See id. 
190 See id. at 674. Judge Ferguson found that despite the trial court's ruling to 
exclude the evidence, LaJoie essentially received what he wanted because the jury 
learned at several points during the trial that others had sexually assaulted VN. [d. 
at 675. The information received by the jury included: (1) a stipulation describing the 
abuse VN suffered at both the hands of her relative and the teenaged boy; (2) that 
VN had participated in group therapy for sexually abused children for several 
months and that LaJoie had nothing to do with that referral; (3) a CSD counselor 
testified that VN "said that her Uncle Clint was the first person who had done what 
she called a bad touch," this testimony revealed that others had molested VN; and (4) 
VN's aunt testified that she had spoken to two police officers about reports of abuse 
that did not relate to LaJoie at all. [d. Judge Ferguson stated that the jury did in 
fact learn that VN had an extensive history of sexual abuse by others but it never-
theless rejected LaJoie's defense of innocence and found him guilty of rape, sodomy, 
and sexual abuse all in the first degree. See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 675-676. 
191 See id. at 676 (citing Wood, 957 F.2d at 1549-1550. In Wood, the Ninth Circuit 
found that if the evidence is not relevant then the defendant has no right to present 
it. See Wood, 957 F.2d at 1550. If the evidence is relevant, the court must inquire 
whether other legitimate interests outweigh the defendant's interests in presenting 
the evidence. [d. In Wood, the Ninth Circuit held that evidence of that the victim 
modeled in Penthouse and acted in pornographic movies was not relevant as to 
whether she consented to a sexual relationship with the defendant, therefore, the evi-
dence was properly excluded. [d. 
192 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 676. 
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duce, was relevant. 193 LaJoie contended at trial that evidence 
of VN's history of sexual abuse was relevant to provide an al-
ternative explanation for what he deemed VN's unusual 
knowledge of sexual terminology.194 However, Judge Ferguson 
argued that VN was ten years old at the time of trial and her 
testimony displayed an awareness of sexual terminology con-
sistent with her age.195 
Judge Ferguson also noted that the Ninth Circuit rejected 
this same argument on indistinguishable facts in United 
States u. Torres. 196 In Torres, the defendant, who was con-
victed of aggravated sexual abuse of a child, argued on appeal 
that the trial court violated his confrontation rights when it 
refused to permit him to provide an alternative explanation 
for what he deemed was his nine-year old victim's sophisti-
cated knowledge of sexual terminology.197 The Ninth Circuit 
refused to reverse the trial court, noting that the victim's tes-
timony did not demonstrate any unusual knowledge of sexual 
techniques or nomenclature, therefore any evidence that 
would provide an alternative explanation was irrelevant. 198 
Judge Fergurson analogized VN's testimony to the young vic-
tim's testimony in Torres because it did not demonstrate that 
VN had an advanced knowledge of sexual terminology.199 Ac-
193 See id. 
194 See id. Judge Ferguson observed that VN did not display a sophisticated 
knowledge of sexual terminology that triggered a constitutional right to present an 
alternative explanation for its source. [d. He pointed to the record which shows that 
only when the prosecutor handed VN an anatomically correct doll was she able to 
say, "he tried to make it fit but it just wouldn't fit." [d. However, soon after that VN 
reverted to telling the jurors that she couldn't verbalize the crimes LaJoie had com-
mitted. See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 676. 
195 See id. Notably, Judge Ferguson described VN's testimony in which she used 
words like "bad touch," "rub," "my private," with "his private," "fingers," "tongue," 
"sore," and "hurt." [d. Moreover, when the prosecution prodded VN with questions 
about where LaJoie had put his "private," she initially responded that she couldn't 
remember and then stated that she could not put into words what LaJoie had done 
to her. [d. 
196 See id. See also United States v. Torres, 937 F.2d 1469, 1470 (9th Cir. 1991). 
197 See Torres, 937 F.2d at 1471-1472, 1474. In Torres the nine-year old victim's 
testimony was similar to VN's testimony in the LaJoie because like VN's testimony it 
was replete with simple references to "private spot," "private parts," and "private 
places." [d. at 1474. 
198 See id. 
199 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 677. 
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cordingly, Judge Ferguson concluded that LaJoie's argument 
that VN's testimony demonstrated an advanced knowledge of 
sexual terminology lacks merit, just as it did in Torres. 200 On 
this basis, Judge Ferguson concluded that evidence of VN's 
history of sexual abuse should have been deemed irrelevant 
and inadmissible.201 
Similarly, Judge Ferguson contended that the evidence, 
which LaJoie attempted to introduce to provide an alternative 
explanation for VN's medical condition, was not relevant for 
this purpose.202 He noted that the prosecutor sought to prove 
that LaJoie had caused VN's repetitive sexual injuries and 
none of the evidence offered by LaJoie could have provided an 
alternative explanation to the State's medical evidence be-
cause it was not indicative of repetitive sexual injuries.203 Al-
though the State's medical expert testified upon cross-
examination that he could not rule out the Watkins' rape of 
VN as the cause of her injuries, Judge Ferguson contended 
that the majority took this testimony out of context.204 
200 See id. Judge Ferguson disputed the majority's attempt to distinguish the 
facts of Torres from LaJoie's case. See id. Although the majority stated that Torres 
was different from LaJoie's case because in 1brres the excluded evidence did not in-
volve penetration, whereas LaJoie's proffered evidence did, Judge Ferguson main-
tained that in Torres the Ninth Circuit did not consider the nature of the evidence at 
all. See id. Rather, the Ninth Circuit in Torres only dealt with the preliminary ques-
tion of whether the victim displayed an uncommon knowledge of sexual terminology, 
and finding that the victim did not, determining the relevance of the evidence was 
unnecessary. [d. Judge Ferguson insisted that the Ninth Circuit did not need to even 
consider the nature of the evidence in LaJoie's case because VN, like the victim in. 
1brres, had· knowledge of sexual terminology that fit her age. See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 
677. 
201 See id. See also supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
202 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 677. Judge Ferguson argued that the prosecution 
sought to convince jurors that VN's medical condition was consistent with repetitive 
sexual injuries. [d. Furthermore, the evidence that LaJoie offered did not match VN's 
medical condition because most of it did not involve penetration and could not have 
caused VN any sexual injury. [d. at 678. Judge Ferguson conceded that the rape of 
VN by Watkins did involve penetration, however, he contended that one rape could 
not have explained the repetitive injury. [d. 
203 See id. 
204 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 667 nA, 677. Judge Ferguson argued that the expert's 
testimony, considered in context, shows that he responded in this way because he 
had not reviewed VN's file and he could not remember the details of VN's history of 
abuse and therefore could not rule out Watkins' role in causing her injuries. [d. at 
677. 
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Notably, Judge Ferguson found that LaJoie's case fell 
squarely under a previous Ninth Circuit case where the state 
convicted the defendant of carnal knowledge of a female less 
than sixteen years of age.205 In Payne, the court rejected 
Payne's argument that the exclusion of this evidence violated 
the Sixth Amendment because the court determined that the 
evidence was more prejudicial than probative.206 Judge Fergu-
son reasoned that the Ninth Circuit's holding in Payne stands 
for the proposition that if the proffered evidence (in LaJoie's 
case, a one time sexual injury; in Payne heavy petting) does 
not provide an alternative explanation for a medical condition 
(in LaJoie's case, repetitive sexual injury; in Payne, multiple 
episodes of sexual intercourse), the trial court does not violate 
the defendant's constitutional rights in refusing to admit the 
evidence.207 Thus, Judge Ferguson concluded that the evidence 
offered by LaJoie at trial was irrelevant.208 
205 See United States v. Payne, 944 F.2d 1458, 1461 (9th Cir. 1991). The trial 
court refused to allow Payne to present evidence that the victim had engaged in 
heavy petting in a trailer with someone else. [d. "at 1468. Similar to LaJoie's case, an 
expert testified, at the trial in Payne, that the condition of the twelve-year-old vic-
tim's vagina was consistent with multiple episodes of sexual injury. [d. at 1470. 
206 See id. at 1469-1470. In Payne, the Ninth Circuit explained that at trial, the 
defendant offered no expert testimony in support of his argument that possible digi-
tal penetration during the petting incident could explain the condition of the victim's 
hymen and vagina. [d. at 1469. Therefore, the incident had minimal, if any, proba-
tive value as rebuttal to the State's medical evidence, and excluding it did not violate 
Payne's confrontation rights. See Payne, 944 F.2d at 1470. Judge Ferguson asserted 
that other circuits have also held that where the evidence the defendant offers does 
not alternatively explain the State's medical evidence, it is not error to exclude such 
evidence. See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 678-679. See, e.g., Jones v. Goodwin, 982 F.2d 464, 
469-470 (11th Cir. 1993) (held that petitioner did not have a constitutional right to 
introduce evidence of the victim's prior sexual conduct when the State did not rely on 
evidence of virginity); United States v. Eagle Thunder, 893 F.2d 950, 954 (8th Cir. 
1990) (held that trial court did not err when it refused to admit evidence of a non-
recent hymenal tear because it could not provide alternative explanation for a recent 
one). 
207 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 679. Judge Ferguson further concluded that the. prof-
fered evidence was irrelevant as to the question of VN's credibility because the jury 
had sufficient information to determine VN's credibility. [d. LaJoie professed his inno-
cence when he took the stand, two teachers testified for the defense that VN was not 
honest and LaJoie was able to vigorously cross-examine VN regarding her motives in 
reporting him for rape. [d. 
208 See id. He concluded that the evidence was irrelevant because, (1) it would 
not provide an alternative explanation for VN's knowledge of sexual vocabulary be-
cause her vocabulary was normal for her age, (2) it would not give jurors an alterna-
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2. The Oregon Supreme Court Properly Applied the Lucas Test 
Judge Ferguson believed that the majority incorrectly 
concluded that the Oregon Supreme Court failed to fulfill its 
constitutional duty under Michigan v. Lucas.209 He noted spe-
cific references in the Oregon Supreme Court's opinion that 
demonstrate that the Oregon Supreme Court properly consid-
ered the facts in LaJoie's case to determine whether the ex-
clusion of the evidence violated LaJoie's Sixth Amendment 
rights. 210 Accordingly, Judge Ferguson reasoned that the Ore-
gon Supreme Court fulfilled its duty under Lucas by consider-
ing the specific facts in LaJoie's case.2l1 
3. Proper Exclusion of the Evidence 
Judge Ferguson also maintained that the Oregon Su-
preme Court properly upheld the trial court's exclusion of the . 
evidence.212 After balancing the interests of the State, the vic-
tim, and LaJoie, he concluded that exclusion of the evidence 
of VN's past history of sexual abuse did not violate LaJoie's 
tive explanation for her medical condition, and (3) it was inadmissible to attack VN's 
credibility. [d. at 679. Although the dissent asserts that the inquiry should end with 
the determination that the proffered evidence was irrelevant, the dissent nonetheless 
analyzes whether the State's interests in excluding it outweighed LaJoie's interests in 
presenting it. See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 679-680. 
209 See id. at 680. The Ninth Circuit, in line with other circuits, has held that 
Lucas requires case-by-case balancing by the court of the particular facts in the peti-
tioner's case to determine whether restrictions on a criminal defendant's rights are 
arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes the restrictions are designed to serve. 
See supra note 169 and accompanying text. Contrary to the mE\iority's assertions, 
Judge Ferguson's opinion asserted that the Oregon Supreme Court did not analyze 
LaJoie's case in the abstract. See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 680. 
210 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 680. The specific parts of the Oregon Supreme Court 
opinion noted by the dissent in which that court discussed the particular facts in La-
Joie's case are: (1) "under the specific facts presented here, we hold that such a fail-
ure [to comply with the statute's notice provision) does . . . require [preclusion) and 
that the requirement is constitutional"; and (2) "[w)e next consider the sub-
constitutional question whether OEC 412 required preclusion as a mandatory sanc-
tion under the facts of this case." [d. 
211 See id. at 680. Judge Ferguson reasoned that the mE\iority's finding that the 
Oregon Supreme Court failed to address the facts in LaJoie's case, pursuant to its 
duty under Lucas, could not be squared with the language in the Oregon Supreme 
Court's opinion. [d. 
212 See id. 
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constitutional rights. 213 Judge Ferguson contended that the 
State had valid reasons for excluding the evidence and its in-
terests in doing so substantially outweighed LaJoie's interests 
in admitting the evidence.214 He noted that the 15-day notice 
period serves several compelling interests and that the Ore-
gon rape shield statute constituted a valid legislative determi-
nation that child rape victims deserve heightened protection 
against surprise, harassment, and unnecessary invasions of 
privacy. 215 
213 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 680. 
214 See id. Judge Ferguson took strong exception to the majority's broad assertion 
that "because the alleged victim was a ten-year old at the time of trial . . . the in-
terest of the victim in eight extra days of repose is far outweighed by the probative-
ness of the excluded evidence." Id. at 680-681. Judge Ferguson declared that this 
broad statement about ten-year old children creates an "unprincipled exception to the 
notice requirement whenever defendants have victimized children. Id. Notably, Judge 
Ferguson stated that the majority failed to cite any authority for this general proposi-
tion about children and their interests in repose. Id. To the contrary, Judge Ferguson 
pointed to United States Supreme Court authority, also acknowledged by the major-
ity, that the well being of child abuse victims may be sufficiently important to out-
weigh, at least in some cases, a defendant's right to face his accusers in court. See 
LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 680-681 (citing Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 853 (1982». See 
also New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-757 (1982) (held that it is evident that a 
State's interest in safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a minor 
is compelling). 
215 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 680-681. The compelling interests enumerated by 
Judge Ferguson were: (1) permitting children to stop worrying about whether they 
will be forced to describe experiences of sexual abuse; (2) protecting the child from 
the additional emotional trauma of having to prepare to recount details of sexual 
abuse so close to trial; (3) offering the child's guardian the opportunity to seek profes-
sional help to assist in coping with the added trauma of having to describe painful 
events in the courtroom; and (4) giving the State an opportunity to discuss with the 
victim the truthfulness of the evidence the defendant seeks to put before the jury. Id. 
For further examples of the interests served by the rape shield statute's notice re-
quirement, the dissent cites authority from other circuits. Id. In Tague v. Richards 
the Seventh Circuit explained that "elimination of the risk of embarrassment fur-
thers the state's interests in encouraging children to report cases of molestation so 
that perpetrators can be prosecuted." Id. at 681 (citing Tague v. Richards, 3 F.3d 
1133, 1139 (7th Cir. 1993». Similarly, in Richmond v. Embry the Tenth Circuit recog-
nized that "allowing the defense to inquire as to the condoms and the male visitor 
would not only have subjected the [12 year old] victim to embarrassment and humili-
ation, but could have had the effect of deterring future victims from reporting sexual 
assaults." See Richmond v. Embry, 122 F.3d 866, 874 (10th Cir. 1997). Judge Ferguson 
noted that the Lucas Court specifically explained that Michigan's notice and hearing 
requirement in its rape shield statute "represents a valid legislative determination 
that rape victims deserve heightened protection against surprise, harassment, and 
43
Dykman: Rape Shield Statutes
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2001
44 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:1 
In addition, Judge Ferguson stated that LaJoie's failure to 
comply with the 15-day notice requirement, even though he 
was aware of this evidence well. in advance of the notice dead-
line, must be considered in weighing all the relevant inter-
ests.216 Because LaJoie did not fulfill the 15-day notice re-
quirement, Judge Ferguson concluded that the State and VN's 
interests in excluding the evidence outweighed LaJoie's inter-
ests.217 Therefore, Judge Ferguson would have affirmed the 
Oregon Supreme Court.218 
4. Any Error Did Not Sufficiently Prejudice LaJoie to Grant 
Habeas Relief 
Judge Ferguson stated that even if the lower court com-
mitted constitutional error by excluding the evidence offered 
by LaJoie, the error was not so prejudicial to warrant a writ 
of habeas corpus.219 He also asserted that the evidence against 
LaJoie was overwhelming.220 He observed that all of the testi-
unnecessary invasions of privacy." See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 681. See also Lucas, 500 
U.S. at 149·150. 
216 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 682. See generally Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 
53 (1996). The Court has recognized the principle that "the introduction of relevant 
evidence can be limited by the State for a 'valid' reason . . . " See Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 
at 53. 
217 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 682·683. Judge Ferguson stated that the State's inter-
ests consist of protecting the child victim from revealing her tragic history, encourag-
ing victims to report abuse, and ensuring that defendants like LaJoie comply with 
notice provisions when they know well in advance of trial the evidence they seek to 
introduce. [d. On the other hand, LaJoie's only interest was placing before the jury 
evidence that Judge Ferguson regarded as minimally relevant, if at all, and confus-
ing. [d. 
218 See id. Judge Ferguson found that the Oregon Supreme Court reasonably up-
held the trial court's exclusion of the evidence of VN's past history of sexual abuse of-
fered by LaJoie and this exclusion did not violate LaJoie's constitutional rights. [d. 
219 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 682. See also supra Part III.A.3. Applying the "sub-
stantial and injurious effect or influence" standard articulated by the United States 
Supreme Court in Brecht v. Abrahamson, Judge Ferguson concluded that if the court 
committed constitutional error, the error did not warrant habeas relief. See LaJoie, 
217 F.3d at 682. See also Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623. The majority applied the same 
standard. See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 682. Judge Ferguson contended that the majority 
erroneously concluded that the error committed by the trial court required habeas 
corpus relief. [d. 
220 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 682. The evidence adduced at trial which Judge Fer-
guson regarded as overwhelming was: (1) VN's testimony that LaJoie molested and 
raped her almost everyday; (2) the testimony of three Children Services Division 
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mony at trial supported the expert's medical evidence indicat-
ing that VN had suffered repetitive sexual injuries.221 Accord-
ingly, he concluded that in light of the minimal probative 
value of the excluded evidence, and the fact that the jury 
learned at several points about VN's extensive history of sex-
ual abuse by others, the exclusion of the evidence did not 
have a substantial and injurious effect or influence on La-
Joie's defense.222 As a result, Judge Ferguson would not have 
granted LaJoie a writ of habeas corpus.223 
V. CRITIQUE 
In LaJoie v. Thompson,224 the Ninth Circuit improperly 
granted habeas relief because the trial court's exclusion of evi-
dence of VN's past history of sexual abuse by others did not 
substantially undermine LaJoie's defense. 225 The United 
States Supreme Court in Michigan v. Lucas offered no defini-
tive guidance for balancing the State's and the victim's inter-
ests against the defendant's constitutional interests under 
rape shield laws.226 Even in the absence of such guidance, the 
prejudicial effect of the evidence, which LaJoie sought to in-
troduce at trial, substantially outweighed its probative 
counselors about VN's consistent out-of-court statements; (3) the testimony of a police 
officer and a doctor that VN offered them substantially similar descriptions of La-
Joie's crimes against her; and (4) the testimony of a teacher of VN during the time 
she lived with LaJoie that VN frequently complained that it "hurt down there." [d. 
221 See id. 
222 See id. at 683. Judge Ferguson argued that had the trial court permitted La-
Joie to introduce the evidence of VN's history of sexual abuse, the jurors would have 
learned that three people assaulted her but never penetrated her and about the rape 
by Watkins that cmild only account for one sexual injury, not the repetitive sexual in-
juries demonstrated by the medical evidence. [d. Moreover, Judge Ferguson reas-
serted that the majority failed to address the. fact that the jury learned at several 
points during the trial about VN's extensive history of sexual abuse by others. See 
LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 683. 
223 See id. 
224 217 F.3d 663 (9th Cir. 2000). 
225 See id. at 673. 
226 See Lucas, 500 U.S. at 153. The Court reman~ed the case for the Michigan 
courts to address whether on the· facts of Lucas' case preclusion violated his rights 
under the Sixth Amendment. [d. The Court expressed no opinion as to whether pre-
clusion was justified in Lucas because the only issue before the Court was the per se 
rule adopted by the Michigan Court of Appeals that preclusion was unconstitutional 
in all cases where the victim had a prior sexual relationship with the defendant. [d. 
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value.227 
A. IMPROPER APPLICATION OF THE MICHIGAN V LUCAS TEST 
Several Ninth Circuit decisions demonstrate that the 
Ninth Circuit's failure to find that the prejudicial effect of the 
evidence offered by LaJoie substantially outweighed its proba-
tive value is inconsistent with Ninth Circuit precedent.228 For 
example, in Wood v. Alaska,229 the Ninth Circuit held that evi-
dence that the victim showed the defendant nude photographs 
of herself from men's magazines and that she discussed her 
pornographic acting experiences with him was more prejudi-
cial than probative and was therefore inadmissible in a rape 
triaJ.230 Although the Ninth Circuit determined that the evi-
dence excluded in Wood was relevant, the Ninth Circuit con-
cluded that the prejudicial effect of the evidence greatly out-
weighed its probative value because Wood presented direct 
evidence that he had a sexual relationship with the victim.231 
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit found it highly probable 
that the jury would improperly consider this evidence and 
draw conclusions that the victim was an immoral woman or 
that a woman with her sexual past could not be raped.232 Ac-
cordingly, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the trial court 
properly excluded the evidence because the potential prejudi-
227 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 673. 
228 See Wood, 957 F.2d at 1544; Payne, 944 F.2d at 1458. The Ninth Circuit ap-
plied the Lucas balancing test in accordance with United States Supreme Court and 
Ninth Circuit precedent, however, the Ninth Circuit should not have granted LaJoie 
habeas relief because the exclusion of the evidence did not substantially undermine 
his defense. See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 673. Although the constitutionality of the appli-
cation of a rape shield statute is determined on a case-by-case basis in accordance 
with Ninth Circuit precedent, the Ninth Circuit's finding in LaJoie cannot be squared 
with Wood and Payne. See discussion infra Part Y.A. 
229 See 957 F.2d 1544, 1546 (9th Cir. 1992). See also supra notes 137-138 and ac-
companying text. 
230 See id. at 1554. 
231 See id. at 1553. The Ninth Circuit found that the evidence was relevant to 
whether the victim had a previous sexual relationship with the defendant Id. The 
Ninth Circuit noted that the defendant himself testified that he previously had sex 
with the victim and he presented witnesses who testified that he and the victim were 
affectionate, that they went into the defendant's bedroom often and once they came 
out of the bedroom partially undressed. Id. See also text accompanying note 66. 
232 See Wood, 957 F.2d at·1552-1553. 
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cial effect substantially outweighed its slight probative 
value.233 
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Payne,234 
held that evidence of the young victim's prior involvement in 
a "heavy petting" incident with another person was more prej-
udicial than probative on the issue of medical evidence of in-
jury to the victim's hymen.235 The Ninth Circuit noted that 
the defendant failed to establish any likelihood that the vic-
tim's alleged prior sexual activity could provide an alternative 
explanation for the medical evidence.236 Although the defend-
ant asserted that digital penetration of the victim possibly oc-
curred during the "heavy petting" incident and that this pene-
tration could explain the condition of the victim's hymen, the 
defendant offered no expert testimony in support of this argu-
ment.237 Again, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the trial 
court appropriately excluded the evidence because the inci-
dent had minimal, if any probative value, which was out-
weighed by the potential prejudicial effect to the young 
victim.238 
In light of Ninth Circuit precedent, the Ninth Circuit in 
LaJoie erred in concluding that the probative value of the evi-
dence of VN's past history of sexual abuse by others out-
233 See id. at 1553-1554. The Ninth Circuit stated that this evidence would be 
more probative in cases where the excluded evidence would establish the bias of a 
crucial prosecution witness and thereby might undermine the witness' credibility and 
the strength of the state's entire case. [d. at 1554. Ai; an exemplar of this type of sit-
uation, the Ninth Circuit noted the United States Supreme Court's holding in Olden 
u. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 232-233 (1988), where the Court found a Sixth Amendment 
violation when the trial court excluded evidence of the rape victim's relationship with 
another man because the rape victim was a crucial prosecution witness and the evi-
dence would have explained why she had a motive to lie. See Wood, 957 F.2d at 1554. 
234 944 F.2d 1458 (9th Cir. 1991). 
235 See id. at 1469. The victim in Payne was the 12-year old foster daughter of 
the defendant. [d. at 1462. 
236 See id. at 1469. 
237 See id. The victim's examining physician at trial testified that the condition of 
the victim's vagina was consistent with multiple episodes of sexual intercourse. See 
Payne, 944 F.2d at 1470. The examining physician also testified that digital manipu-
lation could tear the hymen but it wouldn't be expected to change the size of the vag-
inal canal. [d. Furthermore, the defense expert did not testify that digital manipula-
tion could account for the medical evidence presented by the State. [d. 
238 See id. 
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weighed the danger of unfair prejudice.239 The court main-
tained that because the prosecution relied on medical 
evidence of injuries to VN's hymen, and thereby invited the 
inference that LaJoie must have caused those injuries, evi-
dence that her mother's boyfriend had raped VN became pro-
bative.240 However, the court did not declare that the other in-
cidents of sexual abuse included in the excluded evidence are 
probative on the issue of the medical condition of VN's 
hymen.241 
The Ninth Circuit's conclusion in LaJoie, that the evi-
dence of other acts of sexual abuse in VN's past was more 
probative than prejudicial, is questionable. Those acts of sex-
ual abuse simply did not offer an alternative explanation for 
the presence of VN's injuries stemming from the repetitive 
sexual abuse by LaJoie.242 Moreover, evidence of the one inci-
dent of rape cannot be characterized as highly probative be-
cause it similarly did not offer an alternative explanation for 
the medical evidence, which pointed to repetitive sexual 
abuse. 243 In addition VN did not display a sophisticated 
knowledge of sexual terminology that triggered a constitu-
tional right to present an alternative explanation for its 
source.244 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit should not have char-
acterized the evidence of VN's past history of sexual abuse as 
highly probative on the issue of VN's knowledge of sexual ter-
minology.245 Considering the low probative value of the ex-
cluded evidence, the Ninth Circuit should not have concluded 
that the jury would remain unlikely to draw an unfavorable 
and unwarranted impression of the young victim simply be-
cause the evidence in this case concerned non-consensual sex-
ual abuse of a young child. 
239 See Wood, 957 F.2d at 1544; Payne, 944 F.2d at 1458. 
240 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 671. The majority reasoned that rape is a crime that 
requires proof of penetration. [d. 
241 See id. See also supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
242 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 678. See also supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
The only act of abuse documented in VN's CSD case file, which involved penetration, 
was the rape of VN by her mother's boyfriend. See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 678. See also 
supra note 202 and accompanying text. 
243 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 678. 
244 See id. at 676-679. See also supra Part IV.C. 
246 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 676-679. 
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B. EVEN IF THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY EXCLUDED THE EVI-
DENCE, No SUBSTANTIAL AND INJURIOUS EFFECT OR INFLUENCE 
RESULTED TO GRANT HABEAS CORPUS RELIEF 
The Ninth's Circuit should not have concluded that a 10-
year old child is less entitled to the extra eight days of re-
pose.246 This conclusion stands in stark contrast to the Ninth 
Circuit's decision in United States v. Payne, which held that 
evidence of the young victim's alleged involvement in a heavy 
petting incident with a person other than the defendant had 
low probative value and that the prejudicial effect of an obvi-
ously embarrassing situation outweighed the low probative 
value.247 Even if VN was young at the time of trial, the Ninth 
Circuit ignored its own precedent by failing to acknowledge 
the highly. prejudicial effect that introduction of the evidence 
could have ori VN.248 Judge Ferguson, who dissented, properly 
concluded that the majority's broad generalizations about 
young victims of sexual crimes created an exception to the 
rape shield statute's notice requirement whenever a defendant 
victimizes a young child.249 As a young child, VN did not be-
come less entitled to the protections provided by rape shield 
statutes from undue embarrassment and harassment. To the 
contrary, these protections were of great importance to VN 
because evidence of the prior incidents of sexual abuse in 
VN's past could have possibly caused the jury to improperly 
conclude that VN was the type of child who somehow brought 
this sexual abuse upon herself.250 Thus, the Ninth Circuit 
should have concluded that exclusion of the evidence did not 
have a substantial and injurious effect on LaJoie's defense 
and did not warrant habeas relief. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit's decision in LaJoie demonstrates the 
difficulty courts have in balancing the interests of the state, 
the victims and the Constitutional interests of a criminal 
246 See id. at 672-673. LaJoie filed his notice eight days late under Oregon Rule 
412's 15-day notice requirement. See id. at 665. 
247 See Payne, 944 F.2d at 1469. 
248 See supra Part V.A. 
249 See supra notes 177, 214 and accompanying text. 
250 See Payne, 944 F.2d at 1469; Wood, 957 F.2d at 1544. 
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defendant under rape shield laws. Although the Ninth Circuit 
properly utilized the Lucas balancing test to determine 
whether the trial court's exclusion of the evidence violated La-
Joie's constitutional rights, it improperly concluded that La-
Joie's interests in presenting that evidence to the jury sub-
stantially outweighed the young victim's interests in 
excluding it.251 
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit should not have granted 
LaJoie habeas relief since the trial court did not commit con-
stitutional error by excluding evidence. Even if the trial court 
violated LaJoie's due process and Sixth Amendment confron-
tation and compulsory process rights, this error did not have 
a substantial and injurious effect or influence on LaJoie's de-
fense. Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit improperly determined 
that young victims of sex crimes have less interest in remain-
ing free from the undue harassment and embarrassment that 
rape shield statutes serve to prevent.252 As a result, the Ninth 
Circuit improperly carved out an exception to a rape shield 
statute's notice requirement when the victim so happens to be 
a young child. The United States Supreme Court should not 
develop rigid guidelines to aid the circuit courts in applying 
the Lucas balancing test because the unique circumstances of 
every case would not permit this. Rather, to aid the circuit 
courts, especially in sexual assault cases involving children, 
the Court should entitle young victims to the same protection 
under rape shield statutes as adults. All young victims are 
entitled to this protection regardless of their age or ability to 
understand the court proceedings because all young victims 
are entitled to be shielded from any further unnecessary 
trauma. 
Crystal Dykman * 
251 See Lucas, 500 U.S. at 151-153. See also supra Part III.B.l.b., note 177 and 
accompanying text. 
252 See supra notes 177, 214 and accompanying text. 
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